-由 -businessinsider.com報導的--"據報導,ISIS使用由愛德華·斯諾登洩露的信息弄清楚如何規避情報當局!!"和-由nytimes.com報導的"ISIS負責人採取措施,以確保集團的生存???!"-最慶幸的消息是這則"土耳其同意協助我們打擊空襲ISIS!!"-
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#Snowden
https://twitter.com/hashtag/Snowden?src=hashNews2Tor
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/isis-is-using-information-leaked-by-edward-snowden-2015-7
ISIS is reportedly using information leaked by Edward Snowden to figure out how to evade intelligence authorities
Jul 22 2015,
Still
image taken from video of a man purported to be the reclusive leader of
the militant Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi making what would be
his first public appearance at a mosque in Mosul.
Despite a concerted effort by a coalition of dozens of countries to cripple the Islamic State terror group, the militants continue to operate beneath a shroud of secrecy and maintain a hold on key territory in Iraq and Syria.
The terror group is still entrenched in Raqqa, Syria, the group’s de-facto capital. And in May they seized Ramadi, a key Sunni city in Iraq. The Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh) has been dented by coalition air strikes, but it’s still far from being wiped off the map.
Part of this hinges on ISIS leadership’s ability to evade the forces that are trying to defeat the group. As the German weekly Der Spiegel reported earlier this year, many top ISIS leaders come from former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s Baath party. These officials bring military and intelligence experience with them.
And they might be aided by something else, as well — The New York Times reported this week that ISIS has “studied revelations from Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor, about how the United States gathers information on militants.”
Snowden is currently living in Russia to avoid US espionage charges. He leaked more than a million classified government documents in 2013.
ISIS has reportedly used some of this information to inform its operations, as the group’s communications rely on couriers and encrypted channels that Western analysts can’t crack, according to anonymous officials who spoke with the Times. It’s unclear which specific reports ISIS might have studied. Other terror groups, including al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, have frustrated US intelligence analysts in the past with similar techniques like couriers and encryption.
Even with the information militants might have gained from leaked government documents, ISIS’ security procedures haven’t always worked. ISIS relies heavily on social media for spreading its violent message and recruiting foreigners into its ranks, and last month the US Air Force struck an ISIS headquarters location after an intelligence team geo-located the building based on a social-media post from an ISIS militant. ISIS has now reportedly banned Internet access for most residents who live in Raqqa.
Much of ISIS’ paranoia and security methods likely comes from the former officials in the Hussein regime — Der Spiegel noted that ISIS has modified Saddam’s “omnipresent security apparatus, in which no one, not even generals in the intelligence service, could be certain they weren’t being spied on.”
They’re also structuring the group’s leadership in a way that helps ensure long-term survival.
Though the “caliph” of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is the group’s public face and top religious leader, ISIS has reportedly been allowing others to run operations behind the scenes to make sure that the group won’t collapse if a couple of key people are taken out by air strikes, according to the Times.
Officials close to Baghdadi and regional commanders who are responsible for certain sections of ISIS’ territory have reportedly been given more authority — they receive general guidelines from the top, but ultimately have autonomy to run their own operations, sources told the Times.
From the Times:
In delegating authority, Mr. Baghdadi has drawn lessons from the fates of other militant groups, including that of a branch in Yemen called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, whose leaders have been whittled away by repeated American drone strikes over the years, said a Western diplomat who monitors the group.Baghdadi might have already been wounded in a coalition air strike earlier this year, but this hasn’t been confirmed. The Iraqi Defence Ministry reported that Baghdadi’s second-in-command was also hit in a separate strike, but that hasn’t been confirmed, either.
‘ISIS has learned from that and has formed a structure that can survive the losses of leaders by giving midlevel commanders a degree of autonomy,’ the diplomat said. In that structure, the overall operation would not be immediately affected if Mr. Baghdadi were wounded or killed, he said.
In any case, ISIS is probably here to stay for a while. The Times also reported this week that the group is using terror as a tool to govern and control the territory it has seized. ISIS is handing out ID cards to residents, establishing consumer-protection bureaus and police forces, running schools, and mediating local disputes.
ISIS also campaigns to gain popular support from the residents of its territories.
Though many Westerners associate Islamic State propaganda with violence and beheadings, the terror group also likes to showcase its deceptively “softer” side to those within its territory in the Middle East. One propaganda video recently highlighted by Vocativ shows residents of Mosul, Iraq enjoying a mall and amusement park near the city.
ISIS Propaganda Video
===========
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/isis-is-using-information-leaked-by-edward-snowden-2015-7
據報導,ISIS使用由愛德華·斯諾登洩露的信息弄清楚如何規避情報當局
儘管幾十個國家,以削弱伊斯蘭國恐怖組織的聯盟共同努力,武裝分子繼續經營秘密的護罩下方,並維持在伊拉克和敘利亞境內的關鍵一抱。
該恐怖組織仍然盤踞在Raqqa,敘利亞,該集團的事實上的資本。 而在五月他們抓住拉馬迪 ,一個關鍵的遜尼派城市在伊拉克。 伊斯蘭國(又稱ISIS,ISIL和Daesh)已被削弱聯軍的空襲,但它仍然遠未從地圖上抹去。
這部分取決於ISIS領導的,以逃避那些試圖打敗組力量的能力。 正如德國明鏡周刊報導,今年早些時候 ,許多頂級ISIS領導人來自前伊拉克獨裁者薩達姆的阿拉伯復興社會黨。 這些官員將軍事和情報與他們的經驗。
他們可能被什麼東西可以幫助別人,以及-紐約時報上週報導說ISIS已經“由愛德華·斯諾登雜誌,前國家安全局承辦,有關美國如何收集有關武裝分子信息研究的啟示。”
斯諾登目前住在俄羅斯,以避免美國間諜指控。 他在2013年洩露多萬份機密的政府文件。
ISIS據報導,使用一些這方面的信息,以告知其業務,作為集團的通信依賴於快遞和加密的通道,西方分析家無法破解,根據誰與時俱進發言匿名官員。 目前還不清楚哪些特定的ISIS報告可能影響。 其他恐怖組織,其中包括基地組織的分支機構在也門,有失意的美國情報分析家在過去與像快遞及加密類似的技術。
即使在信息武裝分子可能從洩露政府文件獲得,ISIS的安全程序並不總是奏效。 ISIS在很大程度上依賴於社交媒體傳播的暴力信息,招募外國人進入其行列,上個月美國空軍簽訂了一項ISIS總部地點的情報小組的地緣位於大樓的基礎上從ISIS好戰社交媒體後門柱。 ISIS 現在已經被禁止報導互聯網接入的誰住在Raqqa多數居民。
大部分ISIS'偏執和安全的方法可能來自於薩達姆政權的前官員-明鏡周刊指出,ISIS已經修改薩達姆的“無所不在的安全裝置,其中沒有一個人,在情報部門甚至沒有將軍,可能是某些他們間沒有“T被窺探。”
他們還構建了集團領導的方式,有助於確保長期生存。
雖然ISIS,阿布·貝克爾巴格達迪,的“哈里發”是集團的公眾形象和頂級的宗教領袖,ISIS據報導已經讓別人跑在幕後操作,以確保該組不會,如果一對夫婦的崩潰關鍵人取出空襲,根據時代。
誰是負責ISIS'領土某些部分官員接近巴格達迪和地區指揮官據稱被賦予更多的權力 - 他們收到從頂部的一般準則,但最終的自主權,以經營自己的業務,消息人士告訴時代。
從時代:
在下放權力,巴格達迪先生已經從其他激進組織的命運借鑒,其中包括一個分支在也門稱為阿拉伯半島基地組織 ,其領導人已削弱了反复的美國無人機襲擊,多年來,一說西方外交官誰監視組。巴格達迪可能已在聯軍空襲中受傷的 ,今年年初,但是這並沒有得到證實。 伊拉克國防部報導,巴格達迪的第二號命令也被擊中在一個單獨的罷工,但是這並沒有得到證實,無論是。
“ISIS已經從教訓和已形成,可以通過給中層指揮官一定程度的自治生存領導人的損失結構,”這名外交官說。 在這種結構中,整體運行不會立即受到影響,如果巴格達迪先生受傷或死亡,他說。
在任何情況下,ISIS可能是在這裡呆了一會兒。 紐約時報還報導,本週 ,該集團正在使用恐怖作為工具來管理和控制境內已查獲。 ISIS是發放身份證的居民,建立消費者保護局和警察部隊,辦學和調解糾紛的地方。
ISIS也運動,以獲得從它的領土居民的民眾支持。
雖然許多西方人暴力和斬首關聯的伊斯蘭國家宣傳,恐怖組織也喜歡展示其看似“軟”的一面給那些其在中東地區境內。 一個宣傳視頻最近Vocativ突出顯示了伊拉克摩蘇爾附近享受城市商場和遊樂園的居民。
ISIS Propaganda Video
==========
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/middleeast/isis-strategies-include-lines-of-succession-and-deadly-ring-tones.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0
ISIS Leader Takes Steps to Ensure Group’s Survival
WASHINGTON — The Islamic State’s reclusive leader has empowered his inner circle of deputies as well as regional commanders in Syria and Iraq
with wide-ranging authority, a plan to ensure that if he or other top
figures are killed, the organization will quickly adapt and continue
fighting, American and Iraqi intelligence officials say.
The officials say the leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, delegates authority to his cabinet, or shura council, which includes ministers of war, finance, religious affairs and others.
The Islamic State’s leadership under Mr. Baghdadi has drawn mainly from two pools: veterans of Al Qaeda in Iraq
who survived the insurgency against American forces with battle-tested
militant skills, and former Baathist officers under Saddam Hussein with
expertise in organization, intelligence and internal security. It is the
merger of these two skill sets that has made the organization such a
potent force, the officials say.
But
equally important to the group’s flexibility has been the power given
to Islamic State military commanders, who receive general operating
guidelines but have significant autonomy to run their own operations in
Iraq and Syria, according to American and Kurdish officials. This means
that fighters have limited information about the inner workings of the
Islamic State to give up if captured, and that local commanders can be
killed and replaced without disrupting the wider organization. Within
this hierarchy, Iraqis still hold the top positions, while Tunisians and
Saudis hold many religious posts.
Much of a new understanding about the leadership of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS
or ISIL, has come from information about the organization’s financial
operations, recruiting methods and security measures found in materials seized during
an American commando raid in May in eastern Syria. United States
officials said gathering more insight on the Islamic State’s shadowy
leadership structure was a top priority.
In
delegating authority, Mr. Baghdadi has drawn lessons from the fates of
other militant groups, including that of a branch in Yemen called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
whose leaders have been whittled away by repeated American drone
strikes over the years, said a Western diplomat who monitors the group.
“ISIS
has learned from that and has formed a structure that can survive the
losses of leaders by giving midlevel commanders a degree of autonomy,”
the diplomat said. In that structure, the overall operation would not be
immediately affected if Mr. Baghdadi were wounded or killed, he said.
The
Islamic State has also studied revelations from Edward J. Snowden, the
former National Security Agency contractor, about how the United States
gathers information on militants. A main result is that the group’s top
leaders now use couriers or encrypted channels that Western analysts
cannot crack to communicate, intelligence and military officials said.
The
two top leaders after Mr. Baghdadi appear to be Abu Alaa al-Afri, a
former top deputy to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former militant leader in
Iraq, and Fadel al-Hayali, known as Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, a former
Iraqi Special Forces officer from the town of Tal Afar, near Mosul.
There have been unconfirmed Iraqi reports, however, that both men were
killed in airstrikes in recent months.
It
is unclear who would replace Mr. Baghdadi as the self-declared caliph
if he died, a Kurdish official said. But the official said it could not
be Mr. Afri, assuming he is alive, because he is an ethnic Turkmen, and
the caliph must be an Arab from the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet
Muhammad, as Mr. Baghdadi claims to be.
The
United States is actively hunting Mr. Baghdadi; rumors that he was
killed or injured this year have been dispelled. Defense Secretary
Ashton B. Carter told reporters this month that if the opportunity for a
strike against Mr. Baghdadi presented itself, “we would certainly take
it.”
Despite
the trove of information uncovered in May, American intelligence and
counterterrorism officials say there are still large gaps in what they
know about how the Islamic State’s leadership operates and how it
interacts with a growing number of affiliates and other followers from
Nigeria to Afghanistan.
“It
is going to just take some time to connect everything together,” said a
senior Defense Department official who, like nearly a dozen other
officials interviewed here and in Iraq, agreed to discuss confidential
intelligence reports only on the condition of anonymity.
The
Islamic State’s strict secrecy, which has allowed its leadership to
remain so mysterious, has led to some differences among American and
other Western analysts on the degree to which Mr. Baghdadi is in charge
and whether the main power in the organization rests with his allies,
including several of the former Baathist officers.
A
senior Kurdish security official in northern Iraq and several American
officials said that Mr. Baghdadi was very much the top leader and that
he was involved in issuing orders across the group’s territories. “While
many other group leaders also oversee and manage operations, Baghdadi
asserts his role through providing guidance and holding meetings with
leadership,” said a senior United States military official with access
to classified briefings on the Islamic State.
But other analysts said Mr. Baghdadi’s religious credibility was more significant than any operational prowess.
“Baghdadi
is to a certain extent a religious figurehead designed to grant an aura
of religious legitimacy and respectability to the group’s operations,
while the real power brokers are a core of former military and
intelligence officials,” said Matthew Henman, managing editor of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center.
The
Islamic State maintains tight control over the flow of information
about it, with a list of rules about what its fighters may and may not
mention, analysts said. Much of the information made public, therefore,
has come from the group itself and conveys the image that it wishes to
project.
Kurdish commanders fighting the Islamic State on the ground say certain groups of foreign fighters appear to move like shock troops around territory controlled by the group.
Before
a major Islamic State offensive on the city of Kirkuk early this year,
the Kurds began getting reports that a Russian commander had gone there
with his own group of fighters, said Polad Talabani, the head of the
counterterrorism unit of the Kurdistan regional government.
To
fuel its war effort, the Islamic State relies heavily on explosives and
has set up factories to provide them to fighters. Improvised explosive
devices, or I.E.D.s, defused by Mr. Talabani’s men were welded metal
squares the size of briefcases, with sturdy handles to make them easy to
carry and distribute.
Another
commander displayed cellphone fuses used to remotely detonate bombs. On
each one was a sticker with instructions printed in Arabic on how to
use it, including which ringtone to choose.
“Do
not use Korek SIM cards,” the instructions read, using the name of a
Kurdish-owned wireless company. The warning appears to be a response to
the possibility that Kurdish officials could shut down the cell towers
during a battle so the Islamic State could not detonate its bombs.
A
senior military official with the American-led coalition against the
Islamic State also said the group’s tight security made it hard to know
who exactly is killed in airstrikes.
“We
are not there to follow up,” the military official said. “We are not
there to check on damage that is caused by strikes, and so we have to
make our best assessment by viewing the footage.”
When
asked if the Islamic State was run from the top down or if local
commanders did their own thing, he said, “I’m not sure if we have
clarity on that either way.”
Eric Schmitt reported from Washington, and Ben Hubbard from Erbil, Iraq.
===============
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/middleeast/isis-strategies-include-lines-of-succession-and-deadly-ring-tones.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0
ISIS負責人採取措施,以確保集團的生存
華盛頓-伊斯蘭國家的深居簡出的領導人已經授權代表他的小圈子裡以及區域指揮官在敘利亞和伊拉克有廣泛的權力,一個計劃,以確保如果他或其他高層人物被殺害,該組織將很快適應並繼續戰鬥,美國和伊拉克情報官員說。
該官員說,領導者, 阿布·貝克爾巴格達迪 ,下放權力給他的內閣,或協商會議,其中包括戰爭,財務部長,宗教事務等。
下巴格達迪先生伊斯蘭國的領導人已經得出主要來自兩個池:老兵基地組織在伊拉克的誰下的薩達姆在組織,情報和內部存活反對美國勢力的叛亂與戰鬥考驗的武裝技巧,和前復興黨軍官的專業知識安全性。 這是已經作出了這樣的組織一個強大的力量這兩個技能合併,該官員說。
但該集團的靈活性同樣重要的是給伊斯蘭國軍事指揮官,誰收到的一般業務準則,但有顯著的自主權運行在伊拉克和敘利亞自己的操作電源,根據美國和庫爾德官員。 這意味著,戰士有限有關伊斯蘭國的內部工作信息,放棄在捕捉到,那地方指揮官會被殺死,更換,無需破壞更廣泛的組織。 在這個層次,伊拉克人仍持有的頂部位置,而突尼斯和沙特舉行許多宗教職務。
***土耳其同意協助我們打擊空襲ISIS~
視覺引導伊斯蘭國家的崛起。
許多關於伊斯蘭國,也被稱為領導有了新的認識ISIS或ISIL,擁有來自有關機構的金融業務,招聘方法和發現的安全措施的信息查獲材料期間美國突擊隊突襲5月在敘利亞東部。 美國官員說,收集有關伊斯蘭國的影子領導結構更深入的了解是當務之急。
在下放權力,巴格達迪先生已經從其他激進組織的命運借鑒,其中包括一個分支在也門稱為阿拉伯半島基地組織 ,其領導人已削弱了反复的美國無人機襲擊,多年來,一說西方外交官誰監視組。
“ISIS已經從教訓和已形成,可以通過給中層指揮官一定程度的自治生存領導人的損失結構,”這名外交官說。 在這種結構中,整體運行不會立即受到影響,如果巴格達迪先生受傷或死亡,他說。
伊斯蘭國還研究了從啟示愛德華J.斯諾登,前國家安全局承辦,有關美國如何收集有關武裝分子的信息。 一個主要的結果是,該集團的最高領導人現在使用快遞或西方分析家無法破解通信加密通道,情報和軍事官員說。
巴格達迪先生後,兩位最高領導人似乎是阿布阿拉AL-AFRI,一個前高級副手阿布·穆薩布·扎卡維,伊拉克前領導人領導和法德勒AL-Hayali,被稱為阿布·穆斯林AL-土庫曼語,一伊拉克前特種部隊軍官從塔拉法爾鎮,在摩蘇爾附近。 有未經證實的報導伊拉克,但是,兩人被打死在空襲在最近幾個月。
目前還不清楚誰將會取代巴格達迪先生為自我宣告哈里發,如果他死了,一個庫爾德官員說。 但這位官員說,這不可能是AFRI先生,假設他是活的,因為他是一個民族土庫曼,而哈里發必須從先知穆罕默德的古萊什族阿拉伯,作為巴格達迪先生聲稱是。
美國正在積極追捕巴格達迪先生; 他被打死或受傷,今年的傳聞已經被驅散。 國防部長阿什頓·卡特B.告訴記者,這個月,如果有機會反對巴格達迪先生罷工提出了自己,“我們肯定會抓住它。”
儘管發現在五月的信息寶庫,美國情報和反恐官員說,還存在較大的差距,他們知道如何伊斯蘭國家的領導工作,以及如何與越來越多的分支機構及其他追隨者從尼日利亞到阿富汗進行交互。
“這是怎麼回事,只是需要一些時間來連接一切融合在一起,說:”國防部高級官員誰,就像近十其他接受採訪的官員在這裡和在伊拉克,同意討論只能在匿名的條件機密情報報告。
伊斯蘭國家嚴格的保密,這使得其領導保持如此神秘,導致了中,美等西方分析家在一些程度差異而巴格達迪先生負責,以及是否該組織的主要動力在於他的盟友,包括一些前復興黨軍官。
在伊拉克北部和一些美國官員的一位高級安全庫爾德官員說,巴格達迪先生是非常的最高領導人,他參與發行整個集團的領土訂單。 “雖然許多其他集團領導也監督和管理操作,巴格達迪聲稱通過提供指導和領導召開會議他的角色,說:”能夠訪問的伊斯蘭國家分類簡報的高級美國軍事官員。
但也有分析師表示,巴格達迪先生的宗教可信度比任何業務實力更顯著。
“巴格達迪是在一定程度上是一個宗教的代表人物,旨在給予宗教合法性和尊敬的集團業務的光環,而真正的權力經紀人是前軍方和情報官員組成的核心,”馬修亨曼,總編輯說, IHS簡氏恐怖主義和叛亂中心。
伊斯蘭國家保持嚴格控制的關於它的信息流,約其什麼可以戰機,可能沒有提到的規則列表,分析師說。 大部分的信息公開,因此,擁有來自集團本身並傳達它希望投影圖像。
庫爾德指揮官對地面戰鬥的伊斯蘭國說,外國武裝分子的某些群體似乎像移動突擊部隊圍繞由集團控制的領土。
今年年初基爾庫克市的一個主要伊斯蘭國家的攻勢之前,庫爾德人開始得到報告說,一名俄羅斯指揮官曾與他自己的小組的戰士去那裡,說Polad塔拉巴尼,庫爾德地區政府的反恐單位的負責人。
為了推動其戰爭努力,伊斯蘭國家嚴重依賴於炸藥,並建立了工廠,他們提供給戰士。 簡易爆炸裝置,或簡易爆炸裝置,由塔拉巴尼先生的手下化解被焊接的金屬方形公文包大小,用堅固的手柄,使其易於攜帶和分發。
另一個指揮官顯示用於遠程引爆炸彈的手機引信。 在每一個與印有阿拉伯文如何使用它的說明貼紙,包括選擇哪個鈴聲。
“不要用Korek SIM卡”的指示讀取,使用庫爾德擁有無線公司的名稱。 該警告似乎是到庫爾德官員可以在戰鬥中關閉手機信號塔所以伊斯蘭國家不能引爆炸彈的可能的響應。
與反對伊斯蘭國美國為首的聯軍的一位高級軍事官員還表示,該集團的嚴密的保安使它很難知道到底是誰在空襲中喪生。
“我們是不是有跟進,”軍方官員說。 “我們不是要檢查所造成的損害罷工,所以我們必須通過查看錄像,使我們最好的評價。”
當被問及是否伊斯蘭國是從上往下跑,或者當地的指揮官做自己的事,他說,“我不知道,如果我們有清晰的,要么途徑。”
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Dakoda
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https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/24/uk-met-police-snowden-investigation-journalists/
U.K. Police Confirm Ongoing Criminal Probe of Snowden Leak Journalists
A
secretive British police investigation focusing on journalists working
with Edward Snowden’s leaked documents remains ongoing two years
after it was quietly launched, The Intercept can reveal.
London’s Metropolitan Police Service has admitted it is still carrying out the probe, which is being led by its counterterrorism department, after previously refusing to confirm or deny its existence on the grounds that doing so could be “detrimental to national security.”
The disclosure was made by police in a letter sent to this reporter Tuesday, concluding a seven-month freedom of information battle that saw the London force repeatedly attempt to withhold basic details about the status of the case. It reversed its position this week only after an intervention from the Information Commissioner’s Office, the public body that enforces the U.K.’s freedom of information laws.
Following Snowden’s disclosures from the National Security Agency in 2013, the Metropolitan Police and a lawyer for the British government separately stated that a criminal investigation had been opened into the leaks. One of the London force’s most senior officers acknowledged during a parliamentary hearing that the investigation was looking at whether reporters at The Guardian had committed criminal offenses for their role in revealing secret surveillance operations exposed in the Snowden documents.
In January, The Intercept sought details about the status of the investigation through requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. But the Metropolitan Police, the largest and most powerful of the 45 regional police forces across the United Kingdom, stonewalled the requests. It cited fears about “increased threat of terrorist activity” and claimed that it could not reveal details about the investigation because they could “assist any group or persons who wish to cause harm to the people of the nation.”
In March, The Intercept filed a formal complaint with the Information Commissioners Office over the police force’s refusals, and the oversight body met with police officials to discuss their handling of the case. After months of delays, the force stated in an emailed letter Tuesday that it “can confirm that it continues to conduct an investigation” related to the leaked documents and the people who have handled them. However, it declined to provide any information about the amount of taxpayers’ money spent on the probe or disclose the number of officers working on it, insisting that it does not hold records of these details.
The admission that the investigation remains ongoing triggered criticism from the U.K.’s largest journalists’ organization. Michelle Stanistreet, general secretary of the National Union of Journalists, called on the police to “stop attacking press freedom.”
“Journalists who reported on the Snowden documents are not criminals, they are not a threat to national security,” Stanistreet said in a statement issued to The Intercept. “It is totally unacceptable that the authorities have spent the last two years considering whether they will prosecute British journalists reporting in the public interest.”
Snowden’s first disclosures from the NSA were published in June 2013 by Glenn Greenwald in The Guardian. Greenwald, who was then a columnist for the London-based newspaper, left in October 2013 to co-found The Intercept. The Guardian’s revelations included details about dragnet U.K. Internet spying operations, the exposure of which infuriated top British government officials and led to the newspaper being pressured into destroying hard drives containing copies of the documents.
Four days later, the Metropolitan Police quietly announced that its Counter Terrorism Command had opened a criminal investigation related to the leaks, saying the documents were “highly sensitive” and could “put lives at risk” if published. A London counterterrorism detective stated in a court hearing about the case that it was being viewed as a “conspiracy with a global dimension.”
Despite these assertions, however, the police are yet to charge anyone with an offense in relation to the Snowden debacle.
Media lawyer Mark Stephens told The Intercept he believes there is little realistic prospect of a prosecution being brought against any journalists — and said he thinks the authorities are more interested in creating a “chilling effect” to stifle reporting on secretive national security-related issues.
“The main reason the investigation is still carrying on is probably to create a degree of uncertainty around journalists and their advisers about what can and cannot be done in terms of carrying documents,” said Stephens, who is a partner at London firm Howard Kennedy. “They are trying to shake down and instill fear into journalists and discourage them from exposing things that have to do with national security.”
According to Stephens, the police would need to have a high degree of confidence that the prosecution would be successful to move it forward, and they would also have to show that prosecuting journalists served the public interest, which would be difficult.
The Metropolitan Police had not responded to requests for comment on this story at time of publication.
London’s Metropolitan Police Service has admitted it is still carrying out the probe, which is being led by its counterterrorism department, after previously refusing to confirm or deny its existence on the grounds that doing so could be “detrimental to national security.”
The disclosure was made by police in a letter sent to this reporter Tuesday, concluding a seven-month freedom of information battle that saw the London force repeatedly attempt to withhold basic details about the status of the case. It reversed its position this week only after an intervention from the Information Commissioner’s Office, the public body that enforces the U.K.’s freedom of information laws.
Following Snowden’s disclosures from the National Security Agency in 2013, the Metropolitan Police and a lawyer for the British government separately stated that a criminal investigation had been opened into the leaks. One of the London force’s most senior officers acknowledged during a parliamentary hearing that the investigation was looking at whether reporters at The Guardian had committed criminal offenses for their role in revealing secret surveillance operations exposed in the Snowden documents.
In January, The Intercept sought details about the status of the investigation through requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. But the Metropolitan Police, the largest and most powerful of the 45 regional police forces across the United Kingdom, stonewalled the requests. It cited fears about “increased threat of terrorist activity” and claimed that it could not reveal details about the investigation because they could “assist any group or persons who wish to cause harm to the people of the nation.”
In March, The Intercept filed a formal complaint with the Information Commissioners Office over the police force’s refusals, and the oversight body met with police officials to discuss their handling of the case. After months of delays, the force stated in an emailed letter Tuesday that it “can confirm that it continues to conduct an investigation” related to the leaked documents and the people who have handled them. However, it declined to provide any information about the amount of taxpayers’ money spent on the probe or disclose the number of officers working on it, insisting that it does not hold records of these details.
The admission that the investigation remains ongoing triggered criticism from the U.K.’s largest journalists’ organization. Michelle Stanistreet, general secretary of the National Union of Journalists, called on the police to “stop attacking press freedom.”
“Journalists who reported on the Snowden documents are not criminals, they are not a threat to national security,” Stanistreet said in a statement issued to The Intercept. “It is totally unacceptable that the authorities have spent the last two years considering whether they will prosecute British journalists reporting in the public interest.”
Snowden’s first disclosures from the NSA were published in June 2013 by Glenn Greenwald in The Guardian. Greenwald, who was then a columnist for the London-based newspaper, left in October 2013 to co-found The Intercept. The Guardian’s revelations included details about dragnet U.K. Internet spying operations, the exposure of which infuriated top British government officials and led to the newspaper being pressured into destroying hard drives containing copies of the documents.
“They are trying to shake down and instill fear into journalists.”In Aug. 2013, at the pinnacle of the British backlash, Greenwald’s partner David Miranda was detained and interrogated for nine hours as he was passing through a London airport, and an encrypted set of Snowden files he was carrying to aid Greenwald’s reporting was seized.
Four days later, the Metropolitan Police quietly announced that its Counter Terrorism Command had opened a criminal investigation related to the leaks, saying the documents were “highly sensitive” and could “put lives at risk” if published. A London counterterrorism detective stated in a court hearing about the case that it was being viewed as a “conspiracy with a global dimension.”
Despite these assertions, however, the police are yet to charge anyone with an offense in relation to the Snowden debacle.
Media lawyer Mark Stephens told The Intercept he believes there is little realistic prospect of a prosecution being brought against any journalists — and said he thinks the authorities are more interested in creating a “chilling effect” to stifle reporting on secretive national security-related issues.
“The main reason the investigation is still carrying on is probably to create a degree of uncertainty around journalists and their advisers about what can and cannot be done in terms of carrying documents,” said Stephens, who is a partner at London firm Howard Kennedy. “They are trying to shake down and instill fear into journalists and discourage them from exposing things that have to do with national security.”
According to Stephens, the police would need to have a high degree of confidence that the prosecution would be successful to move it forward, and they would also have to show that prosecuting journalists served the public interest, which would be difficult.
The Metropolitan Police had not responded to requests for comment on this story at time of publication.
Contact the author:
==========
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/24/uk-met-police-snowden-investigation-journalists/
英國警方確認斯諾登洩漏記者正在進行刑事調查
瑞安加拉格爾2015年7月24日.
一個神秘的英國警方的調查重點放在與記者愛德華·斯諾登的洩密文件的工作仍在進行兩年後有人悄悄展開,截取可以透露。
倫敦倫敦警察廳也承認它仍然在進行探頭,它正在由它的反恐部門,此前拒絕證實或否認,理由是這樣做可能是它的存在後,“有損國家安全。”
披露被發送給本報記者週二的信由警察,總結的反复看到倫敦的力試圖隱瞞有關情況的狀態基本細節信息戰七個月的自由。它只有在從信息專員辦公室,強制執行的法律信息,英國的自由公共機構的干預本週改變其立場。
繼國家安全局斯諾登的披露,2013年,大都會警察和一名律師為英國政府分別指出,刑事調查已經開到洩漏。該調查是在看是否在記者衛犯了刑事罪對他們中透露出的斯諾登文件暴露秘密監視行動的作用議會聽證會上,一個倫敦的力的最高級官員的確認。
今年一月,攔截試圖通過關於信息自由法案提出的請求調查的狀態的詳細信息。但警視廳,規模最大,功能最強大的橫跨英國的45地區警察部隊,舉棋不定的請求。它列舉有關“提高恐怖活動威脅”的擔憂,並聲稱它不能透露有關調查的細節,因為他們可以“幫助誰希望造成危害國家的人民任何團體或個人。”
今年三月,該攔截提出正式控告與信息專員辦公室在警察部隊的拒絕,並監督機構見了警察官員討論案件的處理上。經過幾個月的延誤,部隊在一份電子郵件信週二說,它“可以確認,它繼續進行調查”涉及到洩露的文件和誰已經處理他們的人說。但是,它拒絕提供有關納稅人的錢用在了探頭或披露的工作人員就可以了數目之金額的任何信息,堅持不持有這些細節記錄。
該調查仍在進行入場引發了來自英國最大的記者組織批評。米歇爾Stanistreet,全國記者聯盟秘書長,呼籲警方以“停止攻擊新聞自由。”
“誰報導的斯諾登文件新聞工作者不是罪犯,他們是不是對國家安全構成威脅,”Stanistreet頒發給攔截一份聲明中說。 “這是完全不能接受的,當局已經花了近兩年來考慮他們是否會起訴英國記者為了公共利益的報告。”
斯諾登的從美國國家安全局第一個被披露在衛報公佈的2013年6月由格倫·格林沃爾德。格林沃爾德,誰當時的專欄作家倫敦的報紙,留在2013年10月共同發現的攔截。衛報的啟示包括約天羅地網英國互聯網間諜行動,曝光其中激怒頂部英國政府官員,並導致報紙被壓入含有破壞的文件的副本硬盤驅動器的詳細信息。
“他們正試圖晃倒並灌輸恐懼成為記者。”
在2013年8月,在英國間隙的巔峰之作,格林沃爾德的合夥人David米蘭達被雙規了9個小時,當他穿過倫敦機場,和加密設置斯諾登的文件,他背著幫助格林沃爾德的報告被查獲。
四天後,警視廳悄悄宣布其反恐司令部已展開刑事調查,相關漏洞,稱這些文件是“高度敏感”,可能“把生命置於危險之中”,如果公佈。在法院審理有關它被視為一個的情況下的倫敦反恐偵探說“陰謀與一個全球性的層面。”
儘管有這些說法,不過,警方尚未與任何人相對於斯諾登崩潰的罪行充電。
媒體律師斯蒂芬馬克告訴攔截,他認為有一個起訴的一點現實的前景被起訴的任何記者 - 和說,他認為,當局更感興趣的是建立一個“寒蟬效應”扼殺匯報遮遮掩掩國家安全相關的問題。
“主要的原因,調查仍在進行的可能是創建一個學位各地的記者和他們的顧問什麼,不能在執行文件方面做的不確定性,”斯蒂芬斯,是誰在倫敦事務所霍華德·肯尼迪的合夥人說。 “他們正試圖晃倒並灌輸恐懼成為記者和自揭東西,都與國家安全阻止他們。”
據斯蒂芬斯,警方需要有高度的信心,控方會成功,以向前移動,而且他們還必須證明起訴記者有利於公眾利益,這將是困難的。
警視廳沒有對這個故事的置評請求在發布時。
Contact the author:
===========
tz
Reading http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fr/576453/posts … - #Pollard should have been executed - Worse than #Snowden - who didn't get cash from an ally to betray us.
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Why Pollard Should Never Be Released (The Traitor)
The New Yorker Magazine |
Posted on 23/11/2001上午11:32:44 by blackbag
The Case Against Johnathon Pollard
In the last decade, Jonathan Pollard, the American Navy employee who spied for Israel in the mid-nineteen-eighties and is now serving a life sentence, has become a cause celebre in Israel and among Jewish groups in the United States. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, a consortium of fifty-five groups, has publicly called for Pollard's release, arguing, in essence, that his crimes did not amount to high treason against the United States, because Israel was then and remains a close ally. Many of the leading religious organizations have also called for an end to Pollard's imprisonment, among them the Reform Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Orthodox Union.
Pollard himself, now forty-seven, has never denied that he turned over a great deal of classified material to the Israelis, but he maintains that his sole motive was to protect Israeli security. "From the start of this affair, I never intended or agreed to spy against the United States," he told United States District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson,Jr., in a memorandum submitted before his sentencing, in 1986. His goal, he said, was "to provide such information on the Arab powers and the Soviets that would permit the Israelis to avoid a repetition of the Yom Kippur War," in 1973, when an attack by Egypt and Syria took Israel by surprise. "At no time did I ever compromise the names of any U.S. agents operating overseas, nor did I ever reveal any U.S. ciphers, codes, encipherment devices, classified military technology, the disposition and orders of U.S. forces . . . or communications security procedures," Pollard added. "I never thought for a second that Israel's gain would necessarily result in America's loss. How could it?"
Pollard's defenders use the same arguments today. In a recent op-ed article in the Washington Post, the Harvard Law School professor Alan M. Dershowitz, who served as Pollard's lawyer in the early nineteen-nineties, and three co-authors called for President Clinton to correct what they depicted as "this longstanding miscarriage of justice" in the Pollard case. There was nothing in Pollard's indictment, they added, to suggest that he had "compromised the nation's intelligence-gathering capabilities" or "betrayed worldwide intelligence data."
In Israel, Pollard's release was initially championed by the right, but it has evolved into a mainstream political issue. Early in the Clinton Administration, Yitzhak Rabin, the late Israeli Prime Minister, personally urged the President on at least two occasions to grant clemency. Both times, Clinton reviewed the evidence against Pollard and decided not to take action. But last October, at a crucial moment in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations at the Wye River Conference Centers, in Maryland, he did tentatively agree to release Pollard, or so the Israeli government claimed. When the President's acquiescence became publicly known, the American intelligence community responded immediately, with unequivocal anger. According to the Times, George J. Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, warned the President that he would be forced to resign from the agency if Pollard were to be released. Clinton then told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Pollard's release would not be imminent, and ordered a formal review of the case.
The President's willingness to consider clemency for Pollard so upset the intelligence community that its leaders took an unusual step: they began to go public. In early December, four retired admirals who had served as director of Naval Intelligence circulated an article, eventually published in the Washington Post, in which they argued that Pollard's release would be "irresponsible" and a victory for what they depicted as a "clever public relations campaign." Since then, sensitive details about the secrets Pollard gave away have been made public by CBS and NBC.
In the course of my own interviews for this account, the officials who knew the most about Jonathan Pollard made it clear that they were talking because they no longer had confidence that President Clinton would do what they believed was the right thing -- keep Pollard locked up. Pollard, these officials told me, had done far more damage to American national security than was ever made known to the public; for example, he betrayed elements of four major American intelligence systems. In their eyes, there is no distinction between betraying secrets to an enemy, such as the Soviet Union, and betraying secrets to an ally.
Officials are loath to talk publicly about it, but spying on allies is a fact of life: the United States invests billions annually to monitor the communications of its friends. Many American embassies around the world contain a clandestine intercept facility that targets diplomatic communications. The goal is not only to know the military and diplomatic plans of our friends but also to learn what intelligence they may be receiving and with whom they share information. "If a friendly state has friends that we don't see as friends," one senior official explained, sensitive intelligence that it should not possess -- such as that supplied by Pollard -- "can spread to others." Many officials said they were convinced that information Pollard sold to the Israelis had ultimately wound up in the hands of the Soviet Union.
JONATHAN JAY POLLARD was born in 1954 and grew up as the youngest of three children in South Bend, Indiana; his father, Dr. Morris Pollard, was an award-winning microbiologist who taught at Notre Dame. The young boy did not fit in well in South Bend, and members of his family have described his years in public school there as hellish:
he made constant complaints of being picked on and, in high school, beaten up, because he was Jewish. One of the boy's happiest times, the family told journalists after his arrest, came when, at the age of sixteen, he attended a summer camp for gifted children in Israel. He talked then of serving in the Israeli Army, but instead he finished high school and went on to Stanford University. His Stanford classmates later recalled that he was full of stories about his ties to Israeli intelligence and the Israeli Army. He also was said to have been a heavy drug and alcohol user.
He graduated in 1976, and in the next three years he attended several graduate schools without getting a degree. He applied for a Job with the C.I.A. but was turned down when the agency concluded, after a lie-detector test and other investigations, that he was "a blabbermouth," as one official put it, and had misrepresented his drug use. Pollard then tried for a job with the Navy, and obtained a civilian position as a research analyst in the Field Operational Intelligence Office, in Suitland, Maryland. The job required high-level security clearances, and the Navy, which knew nothing about the C.I.A.'s assessment, eventually gave them to Pollard. His initial assignments dealt with the study of surface-ships systems in non-Communist countries, and, according to Pollard's superiors, his analytical work was excellent. While at Suitland, however, he repeatedly told colleagues far-fetched stories about ties he had with Mossad, the Israeli foreign-intelligence agency, and about his work as an operative in the Middle East.
Pollard's bragging and storytelling didn't prevent his immediate supervisors from recognizing his competence as an analyst. He was given many opportunities for promotion, but at least one of them he sabotaged. In the early nineteen-eighties, Lieutenant Commander David G. Muller, Jr., who ran an analytical section at Suitland, had an opening on his staff and summoned Pollard for an interview. "I had respect for him," Muller recalled recently. "He knew a lot about Navy hardware and a lot about the Middle East." An early-Monday-morning interview was set up. "Jay blew in the first thing Monday," Muller recounted. "He looked as if he hadn't slept or shaved. He proceeded to tell me that on Friday evening his then fiancee, Anne Henderson, had been kidnapped by I.R.A. operatives in Washington, and he'd spent the weekend chasing the kidnappers." Pollard said that he had managed to rescue his fiancee "only in the wee hours of Monday morning" -- just before his appointment. Of course, Pollard did not get the job, Muller said, but he still wishes that he had warned others. "I ought to have gone to the security people," Muller, who is retired, told me, "and said, 'Hey, this guy's a wacko.' "
A career American intelligence officer who has been actively involved for years in assessing the damage caused by Pollard told me that Pollard had been desperately broke during this period: "He had credit-card debts, loan debts, debts on rent, furniture, cars." He was also borrowing heavily from his colleagues, in part to forestall possible garnishment of his wages -- an action that could lead to loss of his top-secret clearances. Despite his chronic financial problems, the intelligence officer said, Pollard was constantly spending money on meals in expensive restaurants, on drugs, and on huge bar bills.
In late 1983, shortly after the terrorist bombing of a Marine barracks in Beirut, the Navy set up a high-powered Anti-Terrorist Alert Center at Suitland, and in June, 1984, Pollard was assigned to that unit's Threat Analysis Division. He had access there to the most up-to-date intelligence in the American government. By that summer, however, he had been recruited by Israeli intelligence. He was arrested a year and a half later, in November of 1985.
Pollard was paid well by the Israelis: he received a salary that eventually reached twenty-five hundred dollars a month, and tens of thousands of dollars in cash disbursements for hotels, meals, and even jewelry. In his pre-sentencing statement to Judge Robinson, Pollard depicted the money as a benefit that was forced on him. "I did accept money for my services," he acknowledged, but only "as a reflection of how well I was doing my job." He went on to assert that he had later told his controller, Rafi Eitan, a longtime spy who at the time headed a scientific-intelligence unit in Israel, that "I not only intended to repay all the money I'd received but, also, was going to establish a chair at the Israeli General Staff's Intelligence Training Center outside Tel Aviv."
Charles S. Leeper, the assistant United States attorney who prosecuted Pollard, challenged his statement that money had not motivated him. In a publicly filed sentencing memorandum, Leeper said that Pollard was known to have received fifty thousand dollars in cash from his Israeli handlers and to have been told that thirty thousand more would be deposited annually in a foreign bank account. Pollard had made a commitment to spy for at least ten years, the memorandum alleged, and "stood to receive an additional five hundred and forty thousand dollars ($540,000) over the expected life of the conspiracy."
There was no such public specificity, however, when it came to the top-secret materials that Pollard had passed on to Israel. In mid-1986, he elected to plea-bargain rather than face a trial. The government agreed with alacrity: no state secrets would have to be revealed, especially about the extent of Israeli espionage. After the plea bargain, the Justice Department supplied the court with a classified sworn declaration signed by Caspar W. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, which detailed, by categories, some of the intelligence systems that had been compromised. Judge Robinson, for his part, said nothing in public about the scope of the materials involved in the case, and merely noted at the end of a lengthy sentencing hearing, in March, 1987, that he had "read all of the material once, twice, thrice, if you will." He then sentenced Pollard to life in prison. Pollard's wife, Anne (they had married in 1985), who had been his accomplice, was convicted of unauthorized possession and transmission of classified defense documents and was given a five-year sentence.
Once in jail, Pollard became increasingly fervent in proclaiming his support for Israel. In the Washington Post last summer, the journalist Peter Perl wrote that even Pollard's friends saw him as "obsessed with vindication, consumed by the idea that he is a victim of anti-semitism and that Israel can rescue him through diplomatic and political pressure." Pollard has also turned increasingly to Orthodox Judaism. He divorced his wife after her release from prison, in 1990, and in 1994 proclaimed that, under Jewish law, he had been married in prison to a Toronto schoolteacher named Elaine Zeitz. Esther Pollard, as she is now known, is an indefatigable ally, who passionately believes that her husband was wrongfully accused of harming the United States and was therefore wrongfully imprisoned. "This is the kind of issue I feel very strongly concerns every Jew and every decent, law-abiding citizen," she told an interviewer shortly after the marriage. "The issues are much bigger than Jonathan and myself.... Like it or not, we are writing a page of Jewish history."
ESTHER POLLARD and her husband s other supporters are mistaken in believing that Jonathan Pollard caused no significant damage to American national security. Furthermore, according to senior members of the American intelligence community, Pollard's argument that he acted solely from idealistic motives and provided Israel only with those documents which were needed for its defense was a sham designed to mask the fact that he was driven to spy by his chronic need for money.
Before Pollard's plea bargain, the government had been preparing a multi-count criminal indictment that included-along with espionage, drug, and tax-fraud charges -- allegations that before his arrest Pollard had used classified documents in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the governments of South Africa, Argentina, and Taiwan to participate in an arms deal for anti-Communist Afghan rebels who were then being covertly supported by the Reagan Administration. F.B.I. investigators later determined that in the fall of 1985 Pollard had also consulted with three Pakistanis and an Iranian in his efforts to broker arms. (The foreigners were quietly deported within several months of his arrest.)
Had Pollard's case gone to trial, one of the government's major witnesses would have been a journalist named Kurt Lohbeck, who had a checkered past. He had served seven months in prison after being convicted of passing a bad check in New Mexico in 1977, but by 1985 he was under contract to the CBS Evening News. Lohbeck, who now lives in Albuquerque -- (he received a full pardon from the governor of New Mexico two years ago), acknowledged in a telephone interview that he was prepared to testify, if necessary, about his involvement in Pollard's unsuccessful efforts in 1985 to broker arms sales for the rebels in the Afghan war. At one meeting with a foreign diplomat, Lohbeck said, Pollard posed as a high-level C.I.A. operative. Lohbeck, who was then CBS's main battlefield correspondent in the Afghan war, told me that Pollard had provided him, and thus CBS, with a large number of classified American documents concerning the war. He also told me that Pollard had never discussed Israel with him or indicated any special feelings for the state. "I never heard anything political from Jay," Lohbeck added, "other than that he tried to portray himself as a Reaganite. Not a word about Israel. Jay's sole interest was in making a lot of money."
Lohbeck went on to say that he had also been prepared to testify, if asked, about Pollard's drug use. "Jay used cocaine heavily, and had no compunction about doing it in public. He'd just lay it in lines on the table." In 1985, Lohbeck made similar statements, government officials said, to the F.B.I.
Pollard, told by me of Lohbeck's assertions, sent a response from a jail cell in North Carolina: "My relationship with Lohbeck is extremely complicated. I was never indicted for anything I did with him. Remember that."
The documents that Pollard turned over to Israel were not focussed exclusively on the product of American intelligence -- its analytical reports and estimates. They also revealed how America was able to learn what it did -- a most sensitive area of intelligence defined as "sources and methods." Pollard gave the Israelis vast amounts of data dealing with specific American intelligence systems and how they worked. For example, he betrayed details of an exotic capability that American satellites have of taking off-axis photographs from high in space. While orbiting the earth in one direction, the satellites could photograph areas that were seemingly far out of range. Israeli nuclear-missile sites and the like, which would normally be shielded from American satellites, would thus be left exposed, and could be photographed. "We monitor the Israelis," one intelligence expert told me, "and there's no doubt the Israelis want to prevent us from being able to surveil their country." The data passed along by Pollard included detailed information on the various platforms -- in the air, on land, and at sea -- used by military components of the National Security Agency to intercept Israeli military, commercial, and diplomatic communications.
At the time of Pollard's spying, select groups of American sailors and soldiers trained in Hebrew were stationed at an N.S.A. listening post near Harrogate, England, and at a specially constructed facility inside the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, where they intercepted and translated Israeli signals. Other interceptions came from an unmanned N.S.A. listening post in Cyprus. Pollard's handing over of the data had a clear impact, the expert told me, for "we could see the whole process" -- of intelligence collection -- "slowing down." It also hindered the United States' ability to recruit foreign agents. Another senior official commented, with bitterness, "The level of penetration would convince any self-respecting human source to look for other kinds of work."
A number of officials strongly suspect that the Israelis repackaged much of Pollard's material and provided it to the Soviet Union in exchange for continued Soviet permission for Jews to emigrate to Israel. Other officials go further, and say there was reason to believe that secret information was exchanged for Jews working in highly sensitive positions in the Soviet Union. A significant percentage of Pollard's documents, including some that described the techniques the American Navy used to track Soviet submarines around the world, was of practical importance only to the Soviet Union. One longtime C.I.A. officer who worked as a station chief in the Middle East said he understood that "certain elements in the Israeli military had used it" -- Pollard's material -- "to trade for people they wanted to get out," including Jewish scientists working in missile technology and on nuclear issues. Pollard's spying came at a time when the Israeli government was publicly committed to the free flow of Jewish emigres from the Soviet Union. The officials stressed the fact that they had no hard evidence -- no "smoking gun," in the form of a document from an Israeli or a Soviet archive -- to demonstrate the link between Pollard, Israel, and the Soviet Union, but they also said that the documents that Pollard had been directed by his Israeli handlers to betray led them to no other conclusion.
High-level suspicions about Israeli-Soviet collusion were expressed as early as December, 1985, a month after Pollard's arrest, when William J. Casey, the late C.I.A. director, who was known for his close ties to the Israeli leadership, stunned one of his station chiefs by suddenly complaining about the Israelis breaking the "ground rules." The issue arose when Casey urged increased monitoring of the Israelis during an otherwise routine visit, I was told by the station chief, who is now retired. "He asked if I knew anything about the Pollard case," the station chief recalled, and he said that Casey had added, "For your information, the Israelis used Pollard to obtain our attack plan against the U.S.S.R. all of it. The coordinates, the firing locations, the sequences. And for guess who? The Soviets." (boldface mine - Ronin)Casey had then explained that the Israelis had traded the Pollard data for Soviet emigres. "How's that for cheating?" he had asked.
In subsequent interviews, former C.I.A. colleagues of Casey's were unable to advance his categorical assertion significantly. Duane Clarridge, then in charge of clandestine operations in Europe, recalled that the C.I.A. director had told him that the Pollard material "goes beyond just the receipt in Israel of this stuff." But Casey, who had many close ties to the Israeli intelligence community, hadn't told Clarridge how he knew what he knew. Robert Gates, who became deputy C.I.A. director in April, 1986, told me that Casey had never indicated to him that he had specific information about the Pollard material arriving in Moscow. "The notion that the Russians may have gotten some of the stuff has always been a viewpoint," Gates said, but not through the bartering of emigres. "The only view I heard expressed was that it was through intelligence operations" -- the K.G.B.
In any event, there was enough evidence, officials told me, to include a statement about the possible flow of intelligence to the Soviet Union in Defense Secretary Weinberger's top-secret declaration that was presented to the court before Pollard's sentencing. There was little doubt, I learned from an official who was directly involved, that Soviet intelligence had access to the most secret information in Israel. "The question," the official said, "was whether we could prove it was Pollard's material that went over the aqueduct. We couldn't get there, so we suggested" in the Weinberger affidavit that the possibility existed. Caution was necessary, the official added, for "fear that the other side would say that 'these people are seeing spies under the bed.' "
The Justice Department further informed Judge Robinson, in a publicly filed memorandum, that "numerous" analyses of Soviet missile systems had been sold by Pollard to Israel, and that those documents included "information from human sources whose identity could be inferred by a reasonably competent intelligence analyst. Moreover, the identity of the authors of these classified publications" was clearly marked.
A retired Navy admiral who was directly involved in the Pollard investigation told me, "There is no question that the Russians got a lot of the Pollard stuff. The only question is how did it get there?" The admiral, like Robert Gates, had an alternative explanation. He pointed out that Israel would always play a special role in American national security affairs. "We give them truckloads of stuff in the normal course of our official relations," the admiral said. "And they use it very effectively. They do things worth doing, and they will go places where we will not go, and do what we do not dare to do."
Nevertheless, he said, it was understood that the Soviet intelligence services had long since penetrated Israel. (One important Soviet spy, Shabtai Kalmanovitch, whose job at one point was to ease the resettlement of Russian emigrants in Israel, was arrested in 1987.) It was reasonably assumed in the aftermath of Pollard, the admiral added, that Soviet spies inside Israel had been used to funnel some of the Pollard material to Moscow.
A full accounting of the materials provided by Pollard to the Israelis has been impossible to obtain: Pollard himself has estimated that the documents would create a stack six feet wide, six feet long, and ten feet high. Rafi Eitan, the Israeli who controlled the operation, and two colleagues of his attached to the Israeli diplomatic delegation -- Irit Erb and Joseph Yagur -- were named as unindicted co-conspirators by the Justice Department. In the summer of 1984, Eitan brought in Colonel Aviem Sella, an Air Force hero, who led Israel's dramatic and successful 1981 bombing raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. (Sella was eventually indicted, in absentia, on three counts of espionage.) Eitan's decision to order Sella into the case is considered by many Americans to have been a brilliant stroke: the Israeli war hero was met with starry eyes by Pollard, a chronic wannabe.
Yagur, Erb, and Sella were in Washington when Pollard was first seized by the F.B.I., in November, 1985, but they quickly left the country, never to return. During one period, Pollard had been handing over documents to them almost weekly, and they had been forced to rent an apartment in northwest Washington, where they installed a high-speed photocopying machine. "Safe houses and special Xeroxes?" an American career intelligence officer said, despairingly, concerning the Pollard operation. "This was not the first guy they'd recruited." In the years following Pollard's arrest and confession, the Israeli government chose not to cooperate fully with the F.B.I. and Justice Department investigation, and only a token number of the Pollard documents have been returned. It was not until last May that the Israeli government even acknowledged that Pollard had been its operative.
In fact, it is widely believed that Pollard was not the only one in the American government spying for Israel. During his year and a half of spying, his Israeli handlers requested specific documents, which were identified only by top-secret control numbers. After much internal assessment, the government's intelligence experts concluded that it was "highly unlikely," in the words of a Justice Department official, that any of the other American spies of the era would have had access to the specific control numbers. "There is only one conclusion," the expert told me. The Israelis "got the numbers from somebody else in the U.S. government."
THE men and women of the National Security Agency live in a world of chaotic bleeps, buzzes, and whistles, and talk to each other about frequencies, spectrums, modulation, and bandwidth -- the stuff of Tom Clancy novels. They often deal with signals intelligence, or SIGINT, and their world is kept in order by an in-house manual known as the RASIN an acronym for radio-signal notations. The manual, which is classified "top-secret Umbra," fills ten volumes, is constantly updated, and lists the physical parameters of every known signal. Pollard took it all. "It's the Bible," one former communications-intelligence officer told me. "It tells how we collect signals anywhere in the world." The site, frequency, and significant features of Israeli communications -- those that were known and targeted by the N.S.A. -- were in the RASIN; so were all the known communications links used by the Soviet Union.
The loss of the RASIN was especially embarrassing to the Navy, I was told by the retired admiral, because the copy that Pollard photocopied belonged to the Office of Naval Intelligence. "He went into our library, found we had an out-of-date version, requested a new one, and passed it on," the officer said. "I was surprised we even had it."
The RASIN theft was one of the specifics cited in Defense Secretary Weinberger's still secret declaration to the court before Pollard's sentencing hearing. In fact, the hearing's most dramatic moment came when Pollard's attorney, Richard A. Hibey, readily acknowledged his client's guilt but argued that the extent of the damage to American national security did not call for the imposition of a maximum sentence.
"I would ask you to think about the Secretary of Defense's affidavit, as it related to only one thing," Judge Robinson interjected, "with reference to one particular category of publication, and I fail to see how you can make that argument." He invited Hibey to approach the bench, along with the Justice Department attorneys, and the group spent a few moments reviewing what government officials told me was Weinberger's account of the importance of the RAISIN. One Justice Department official, recalling those moments with obvious pleasure, said that the RASIN was the ninth item on the Weinberger damage-assessment list. After the bench conference, Hibey made no further attempt to minimize the national-security damage caused by its theft. (Citing national security, Hibey refused to discuss the case for this article.)
The ten volumes of the RASIN were available on a need-to-know basis inside the N.S.A. "I've never seen the monster," a former senior watch officer at an N.S.A. intercept site in Europe told me, but added that he did supervise people who constantly used it, and he described its function in easy-to-understand terms:
"It is a complete catalogue of what the United States was listening to, or could listen to -- information referred to in the N.S.A. as 'parametric data.' It tells you everything you want to know about a particular signal -- when it was first detected and where, whom it was first used by, what kind of entity, frequency, wavelength, or band length it has. When you've copied a signal and don't know what it is, the RASIN manual gives you a description." A senior intelligence official who consults regularly with the N.S.A. on technical matters subsequently told me that another issue involved geometry.
A senior intelligence official who consults regularly with the N.S.A. on technical matters subsequently told me that another issue involved geometry. The RASIN, he explained, had been focussed in particular on the Soviet Union and its thousands of high-frequency, or shortwave, communications, which had enabled Russian military units at either end of the huge land mass to communicate with each other. Those signals "bounced" off the ionosphere and were often best intercepted thousands of miles from their point of origin. If, as many in the American intelligence community suspected, the Soviet communications experts had been able to learn which of their signals were being monitored, and where, they could relocate the signal and force the N.S.A. to invest man-hours and money to try to recapture it. Or, more likely, the Soviets could continue to communicate in a normal fashion but relay false and misleading information.
Pollard's betrayal of the RASIN put the N.S.A. in the position of having to question or reevaluate all of its intelligence collecting. "We aren't perfect," the career intelligence officer explained to me. "We've got holes in our coverage, and this" -- the loss of the RASIN -- tells where the biases and the weaknesses are. It's how we get the job done, and how we will get the job done."
"What a wonderful insight into how we think, and exactly how we're exploiting Soviet communications!" the retired admiral exclaimed. "It's a how-to-do-it book -- the fireside cookbook of cryptology. Not only the analyses but the facts of how we derived our analyses. Whatever recipe you want."
Pollard, asked about the specific programs he compromised, told me, "As far as SIGINT information is concerned, the government has consistently lied in its public version of what I gave the Israelis."
In the mid-nineteen-eighties, the daily report from the Navy's Sixth Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) in Rota, Spain, was one of America's Cold War staples. A top-secret document filed every morning at 0800 Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time), it reported all that had gone on in the Middle East during the previous twenty-four hours, as recorded by the N.S.A.'s most sophisticated monitoring devices.
The reports were renowned inside Navy commands for their sophistication and their reliability; they were based, as the senior managers understood it, on data supplied both by intelligence agents throughout the Middle East and by the most advanced technical means of intercepting Soviet military communications. The Navy's intelligence facility at Rota shared space with a huge N.S.A. intercept station, occupied by more than seven hundred linguists and cryptographers, which was responsible for monitoring and decoding military and diplomatic communications all across North Africa. Many at Rota spent hundreds of hours a month listening while locked in top-secret compartments aboard American ships, aircraft, and submarines operating in the Mediterranean.
The Navy's primary targets were the ships, the aircraft, and, most important, the nuclear-armed submarines of the Soviet Union on patrol in the Mediterranean. Those submarines, whose nuclear missiles were aimed at United States forces, were constantly being tracked; they were to be targeted and destroyed within hours if war broke out.
Pollard's American interrogators eventually concluded that in his year and a half of spying he had provided the Israelis with more than a year's worth of the daily FOSIF reports from Rota. Pollard himself told the Americans that at one point in 1985 the Israelis had nagged him when he missed several days of work because of illness and had failed to deliver the FOSIF reports for those days. One of his handlers, Joseph Yagur, had complained twice about the missed messages and had asked him to find a way to retrieve them. Pollard told his American interrogators that he had never missed again.
The career intelligence officer who helped to assess the Pollard damage has come to view Pollard as a serial spy, the Ted Bundy of the intelligence world. "Pollard gave them every message for a whole year," the officer told me recently, referring to the Israelis. "They could analyze it" -- the intelligence -- "message by message, and correlate it. They could not only piece together our sources and methods but also learn how we think, and how we approach a problem. All of a sudden, there is no mystery. These are the things we can't change. You got this, and you got us by the balls." In other words, the Rota reports, when carefully studied, gave the Israelis "a road map on how to circumvent" the various American collection methods and shield an ongoing military operation. The reports provide guidance on "how to keep us asleep, thinking all is working well," he added. "They tell the Israelis how to raid Tunisia without tipping off American intelligence in advance. That is damage that is persistent and severe."
NOT every document handed over by Pollard dealt with signals intelligence. DIAL-COINS is the acronym for the Defense Intelligence Agency's Community On-Line Intelligence System, which was one of the government's first computerized information-retrieval-network systems. The system, which was comparatively primitive in the mid-nineteen-eighties -- it used an 8088 operating chip and thermafax paper -- could not be accessed by specific issues or key words but spewed out vast amounts of networked intelligence data by time frame. Nevertheless, DIAL-COINS contained all the intelligence reports filed by Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine attaches in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East. One official who had been involved with it told me recently, "It was full of great stuff, particularly in HUMINT -- human intelligence. Many Americans who went to the Middle East for business or political reasons agreed, as loyal citizens, to be debriefed by American defense attaches after their visits. They were promised anonymity -- many had close friends inside Israel and the nearby Arab states who would be distressed by their collaboration -- and the reports were classified. "It's who's talking to whom," the officer said. "Like handing you the address book of the spooks for a year."
Government investigators discovered that one of the system's heaviest users in 1984 and 1985 was Jonathan Pollard. He had all the necessary clearances and necessary credentials to gain access to the classified Pentagon library; he also understood that librarians, even in secret libraries, are always eager to help, and in one instance he relied on the library security guards. With some chagrin, officials involved in the Pollard investigation recounted that Pollard had once collected so much data that he needed a handcart to move the papers to his car, in a nearby parking lot, and the security guards held the doors for him.
Pollard also provided the Israelis with what is perhaps the most important day-to-day information in signals intelligence: the National SIGINT Requirements List, which is essentially a compendium of the tasks, and the priority of those tasks, given to various N.S.A. collection units around the world. Before a bombing mission, for example, a United States satellite might be re-deployed, at enormous financial cost, to provide instantaneous electronic coverage of the target area. In addition, N.S.A. field stations would be ordered to begin especially intensive monitoring of various military units in the target nation. Special N.S.A. coverage would also be ordered before an American covert military unit, such as the Army's Delta Force or a Navy Seal team, was inserted into hostile territory or hostile waters. Sometimes the N.S.A.'s requests were less comprehensive: a European or Middle Eastern business suspected of selling chemical arms to a potential adversary might be placed on the N.S.A. "watch list" and its faxes, telexes, and other communications carefully monitored. The Requirements List is "like a giant to-do list," a former N.S.A. operative told me. "If a customer" -- someone in the intelligence community -- "asked for specific coverage, it would be on a list that is updated daily." That is, the target of the coverage would be known.
"If we're going to bomb Iraq, we will shift the system," a senior specialist subsequently told me. "It's a tipoff where the American emphasis is going to be." With the List, the specialist added, the Israelis "could see us move our collection systems" prior to military action, and eventually come to understand how the United States Armed Forces "change our emphasis." In other words, he added, Israel "could make our intelligence system the prime target" and hide whatever was deemed necessary. "The damage goes past Jay's arrest," the specialist said, "and could extend up to today."
Israel made dramatic use of the Pollard material on October 1, 1985, seven weeks before his arrest, when its Air Force bombed the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunisia, killing at least sixty-seven people. The United States, which was surprised by the operation, eventually concluded that the Israeli planners had synergistically combined the day-to-day insights of the SIGINT Requirements List with the strategic intelligence of the FOSIF reports and other data that Pollard provided to completely outwit our government's huge collection apparatus in the Middle East. Even Pollard himself, the senior official told me, "had no idea what he gave away." The results of President Clinton's requested review of the Pollard case by officials in the intelligence community and other interested parties were to be presented to the White House by January 11th. A former Justice Department official told me, "Nobody can believe that any President would have the gall to release this kind of spy." But as the report was being prepared the nature of the questions that the White House was referring to the Justice Department convinced some intelligence officials that Clinton was considering a compromise, such as commuting Pollard's life sentence to twenty-five years in prison.
The queries about commutation were coming not from Roger Adams, the President's pardon attorney, but from Charles F. C. Ruff, the White House counsel. "Pollard would get half a loaf," one distraught career intelligence official told me. The deal believed to be under consideration would provide for his release, with time off for good behavior, in the summer of 2002. The solution had a certain "political beauty," the official added -- in the eyes of the White House. "Pollard doesn't get out right away, and the issue doesn't cause any trouble. And getting the United States to bend would be a serious victory for Israel."
A senior intelligence official whose agency was involved in preparing the report for the White House told me, somewhat facetiously, that he would drop all objections to Pollard's immediate release if the Israeli government would answer two questions: "First, give us a list of what you've got, and, second, tell us what you did with it." Such answers are unlikely to be forthcoming. The Israeli government has acknowledged that Pollard was indeed spying on its behalf but has refused -- despite constant entreaties -- to provide the United States with a complete list of the documents that were turned over to it.
Some members of the intelligence community view themselves today as waging a dramatic holding action against a President who they believe is eager to split the difference with the Israelis on Pollard's fate. They see Bill Clinton as a facilitator who would not hesitate to trade Pollard to the Israelis if he thought that would push Israel into a peace settlement and result in a foreign-policy success. The officials emphasize that they support Clinton's efforts to resolve the Middle East crisis but do not think it is appropriate to use Pollard as a bargaining chip.
Adding to their dismay, some officials made clear, is the fact that Clinton himself, having studied the case years ago, when he was considering Yitzhak Rabin's request for clemency, knows as much as anyone in the United States government about the significance of Pollard's treachery. One informed official described a private moment at the Wye peace summit when George Tenet, the C.I.A. director, warned the President that Pollard's release would enrage and demoralize the intelligence community. "What he got back," the official told me, "was 'Nah, don't worry about it. It'll blow over.' "
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為什麼波拉德應該永遠不會被釋放(漢奸)
紐約客雜誌
發布於2001年11月22日下午7時32分44秒的PST由blackbag
針對喬納森波拉德案
在過去的十年裡,喬納森·波拉德,美國海軍的員工誰在中間二十世紀八十年代從事間諜活動的以色列,現在服無期徒刑,已成為一項事業轟動在以色列和之間在美國猶太團體。 主要美國猶太組織,55組的財團的主席會議,已公開呼籲波拉德獲釋,認為,從本質上說他的罪行並沒有構成危害美國的叛國罪,因為以色列是當時和遺體親密盟友。 許多領先的宗教組織也呼籲停止波拉德的監禁,其中包括美國希伯來會眾的改革聯盟和正統的聯盟。
波拉德自己,現在47,從來沒有否認他上繳了大量的機密材料的以色列人,但他堅持認為,他的唯一動機是為了保護以色列的安全。 “從這段戀情的開始,我從來沒有打算或同意間諜對美國,”他告訴美國地方法院法官奧布里·羅賓遜,JR。,在他宣判前提交了一份備忘錄,在1986年他的 目標,他說: ,是“提供關於阿拉伯權力和蘇聯這將允許以色列人避免贖罪日戰爭中,重複這樣的信息,”在1973年,當埃及和敘利亞攻擊以色列了驚喜。 “在任何時候我有沒有妥協的海外經營任何美國代理商的名稱,也沒有我曾經透露任何美國的密碼,編碼,加密設備,機密軍事技術,美國軍隊。或通信安全程序的配置和訂單, “波拉德補充。 “我從來沒有想過一秒鐘,以色列的增益必然導致美國損失。怎麼可能呢?”
波拉德的捍衛者使用相同的論點今天。 在華盛頓郵報,美國哈佛大學法學院教授阿蘭·M.·德肖維茨,誰擔任波拉德的律師早在20世紀九十年代,三合著者最近的專欄文章,稱克林頓總統來糾正他們描繪成“正義在波拉德情況下,這個長期存在的流產“。 有沒有在波拉德的起訴書中,他們增加了,表明他已“損害了國家的情報收集能力”或“背叛全世界的情報數據。”
在以色列,波拉德的發行是由權最初倡導,但它已演變成一個主流的政治問題。 早在克林頓政府,拉賓,以色列已故總理,親自敦促至少有兩次總統給予寬大處理。 這兩次,克林頓對審查波拉德的證據,並決定不採取行動。 但去年10月,在伊河會議中心的以色列 - 巴勒斯坦和平談判的關鍵時刻,在馬里蘭州,他做了初步同意釋放波拉德,還是讓以色列政府聲稱。 當總統的默許成了公眾所知,美國情報界立即作出反應,以毫不含糊的憤怒。 根據時代,喬治·特尼特雜誌,中央情報局的局長,警告總統,他將被迫從該機構辭職,如果波拉德都被釋放。 克林頓則告訴總理內塔尼亞胡波拉德獲釋不會迫在眉睫,並下令案件的正式審查。
總統願意考慮寬大處理波拉德很沮喪的情報界,它的領導人採取了一個不尋常的舉動:他們開始上市。 12月初,誰曾擔任海軍情報總監4退休的海軍上將流傳的一篇文章,最終發表在華盛頓郵報,其中他們認為,波拉德的發布將是“不負責任的”,並一次勝利為他們描繪成一個“聰明的公眾關係的運動。“ 此後,有關秘密波拉德一語道破敏感的細節已經公開由CBS和NBC。
在我自己的採訪本賬戶的過程中,官員誰知道最關心喬納森·波拉德明確表示,他們正在談論,因為他們不再有信心,克林頓總統會做什麼,他們認為是正確的事情 - 不斷波拉德鎖定起來。 波拉德,這些官員告訴我,做了比以往任何時候都被製作為公眾所知悉美國的國家安全更為損壞; 例如,他背叛了四個主要的美國情報系統的元素。 在他們眼裡,有出賣秘密的敵人,如蘇聯,出賣秘密盟友之間沒有區別。
官員不願公開談論它,但刺探盟國是生活中的事實:美國投資數十億美元,每年以監測其朋友的通信。 世界各地的許多美國大使館含有秘密攔截設施為目標的外交通訊。 我們的目標是不僅要知道軍隊和我們的朋友的外交計劃,但還學什麼情報,他們可以接收並與他們分享信息。 “如果一個國家的友好有了朋友,我們沒有看到像朋友一樣,”一位高級官員解釋說,敏感的情報,它不應該擁有 - 例如由波拉德提供的 - “可以傳播給其他人。” 許多官員說,他們相信,信息波拉德賣給以色列人最終結束了在蘇聯的手中。
JONATHAN JAY POLLARD出生於1954年,成長為最年輕的三個孩子在南本德,印第安納; 他的父親,莫里斯波拉德博士,是一個屢獲殊榮的微生物學家誰任教於巴黎聖母院。 年輕的男孩沒有很好適應在南本德和他的家人都描述了他多年在公立學校那裡地獄般的:
他做了常數被欺負,在高中,毆打的投訴,因為他是猶太人。 其中一個男孩的最快樂的時光,家人告訴記者被捕後,當在十六歲時,他參加了一個夏令營在以色列天才兒童來了。 他談到,然後在以色列軍隊中服役,而是他完成了高中學業,並繼續為美國斯坦福大學。 他的同學斯坦福後來回憶說,他充滿了他的聯繫,以色列情報和以色列軍隊的故事。 他也被說成是一個沉重的毒品和酒精的用戶。
他畢業於1976年,並在未來三年中,他參加了幾個研究生院沒有拿到學位。 他申請了美國中央情報局工作,但遭到拒絕時,該機構的結論,一個測謊測試等進行調查後,認為他是一個“長舌”,作為一位官員說,並歪曲了他吸毒。 波拉德然後試圖與海軍工作,並獲得了平民地位的研究分析師在實地作戰情報局,在蘇特蘭,馬里蘭州。 這項工作所需的高級別安全間隙,和海軍,這一無所知中央情報局的評估,最終給了他們波拉德。 他最初的任務處理的表面艦艇系統在非共產主義國家的研究,並根據波拉德的上司,他的分析工作是出色的。 而在蘇特蘭,然而,他反复叮囑同事們有關的聯繫,他曾與摩薩德,以色列對外情報局牽強的故事,以及他在中東的業務工作。
波拉德的吹牛和講故事並沒有阻止他的頂頭上司從認識他的能力作為一個分析師。 他得到晉升的機會很多,但至少其中之一,他破壞。 早在20世紀八十年代,中尉指揮官戴維·穆勒,小,誰在蘇特蘭跑了分析部分,對他的工作人員一開口,並傳喚波拉德的採訪。 “我對他的尊重,”穆勒最近回憶。 “他知道了很多關於海軍的硬件和許多關於中東地區。” 一個早期星期一上午接受採訪時成立。 “周杰倫自爆的第一件事週一,”穆勒回憶。 “他看上去好像他沒有睡或剃掉,他接著告訴我,上週五晚上,他的未婚妻話,安妮恆基兆業,已經被綁架了IRA操作工在華盛頓,而他已經度過了週末,追逐綁匪。” 波拉德說,他曾設法營救他的未婚妻“只在凌晨週一早上” - 只是他的任命之前。 當然,波拉德沒有得到這份工作,穆勒說,但他仍然希望,他曾警告其他人。 “我應該已經到了安全人員,”穆勒,誰是退休了,告訴我“,並說,'嘿,這傢伙是個瘋子。” “
職業生涯的美國情報官員誰一直積極參與多年的評估造成波拉德的傷害告訴我,波拉德曾拼命地在此期間,朗聲道:“他有信用卡債務,貸款債務,債務的租金,家具,汽車。 “ 他還大力借用他的同事們,部分原因是為了防止他的工資扣發可能 - 這可能導致他的絕密間隙損失的行為。 儘管他的長期財政問題,情報官員說,波拉德是不斷花錢的飯菜昂貴的餐廳,藥物,以及巨大的酒吧賬單。
1983年下旬,海軍陸戰隊營房在貝魯特的恐怖爆炸事件後不久,美國海軍成立了一個高功率的反恐警報中心在蘇特蘭,並於1984年6月,波拉德被分配到該單位的威脅分析部。 他曾獲得有最先進的最新情報是美國政府。 到那個夏天,但是,他已經招募以色列情報。 他被逮捕了一年半以後,在1985年11月。
波拉德支付以及以色列人:他的現金支出為酒店,餐飲,甚至是珠寶收到的幾萬塊錢的薪水,最終達到兩千五百塊錢一個月,。 在他的判決前聲明魯濱遜法官,波拉德描述的錢是被迫對他的好處。 “我沒接受金錢為我服務,”他承認,但只是“為我做的有多好我的工作的反映。” 他又斷言他後來告訴他的控制器,拉菲·埃坦,一個長期間諜誰當時在率領以色列科學情報單位,說:“我不只是為了報答所有我已經收到了錢,但也,是要建立一個椅子上特拉維夫外的以色列總參謀部的情報訓練中心。“
查爾斯利珀中,美國助理檢察官起訴誰波拉德,挑戰他的聲明中稱,金錢不是激勵他。 在一個公開提出量刑備忘錄,利珀說,波拉德被稱為已收到五萬美元的現金從他的以色列處理程序,並已被告知,三萬多將在外國銀行賬戶存入每年。 波拉德曾作出承諾,為間諜至少十年,據稱該備忘錄,以及“站到了陰謀的預期壽命獲得額外的54萬美元(540000美元)。”
有沒有這樣的公共特殊性,但是,當它來到了波拉德已經傳遞到以色列絕密材料。 在1986年年中,他當選為認罪,討價還價,而不是面對審判。 政府同意爽快:沒有國家機密就必須披露,特別是有關以色列間諜的程度。 在辯訴交易之後,司法部提供的法院由卡斯帕·溫伯格W.,國防部長,裡面詳細介紹,按類別,一些已經失密的智能系統簽訂了分類宣誓聲明。 魯濱遜法官,對他而言,什麼也沒有說在公眾參與的情況下,材料的範圍,而僅僅在指出一個漫長的量刑聽證會結束後,3月份,1987年,他有“讀所有的材料一次,兩次,三次,如果你願意“。 隨後,他被判處波拉德終身監禁。 波拉德的妻子安妮(他們已經結婚了,1985年),誰是他的幫兇,被定罪的未經授權的佔有和歸類國防文件的傳輸,並給予了五年的句子。
一旦在監獄裡,波拉德成為公開宣稱他對以色列的支持越來越熱切。 在華盛頓郵報去年夏天,記者彼得·Perl寫的,即使是波拉德的朋友們都視他為“迷戀平反,由想法,他是反猶太主義和以色列可以通過外交和政治壓力來救他的受害者消耗。” 波拉德也日益轉向正統的猶太教。 他離婚,他的妻子從監獄釋放她之後,於1990年,並於1994年宣布,根據猶太律法,他已經結婚了監獄名為伊萊恩·蔡茨多倫多教師。 以斯帖波拉德,因為她現在已經知道,是一個不知疲倦的盟友,誰熱情地認為,她的丈夫被冤枉損害美國的支持,因此錯誤監禁。 “這是我感受到那種問題的強烈關注每一個猶太人和每一個體面,守法的公民,”她告訴面試官婚後不久。 “這些問題是不是喬納森和我自己更大的....不管你喜歡與否,我們正在寫猶太人的歷史的一頁。”
ESTHER POLLARD和她的丈夫S其他支持者是錯誤的相信,喬納森·波拉德給美國國家安全沒有任何損害顯著。 此外,根據美國情報界的資深人士,波拉德的說法,他只擔任從理想主義的動機,並提供以色列只有與需要為它的防禦是設計用來掩蓋一個事實,即他的動力來自於間諜假的證件他慢性需要錢。
波拉德之前的認罪協商,政府已經準備了多支刑事起訴,其中包括,與間諜活動,毒品,以及稅務欺詐指控 - 指控他被捕之前曾波拉德在不成功的企圖說服政府使用機密文件南非,阿根廷和台灣參與武器交易的是誰,然後由裡根政府正在暗中支持反共產主義叛亂分子的阿富汗。 FBI調查後確定,在1985年的秋天波拉德也徵求有三個巴基斯坦人和在他的努力促成武器的伊朗。 (該外國人幾個月他被捕之內悄悄驅逐出境。)
曾波拉德的情況下,去審判,政府的主要證人之一將是一個名為庫爾特Lohbeck,誰格仔過去的記者。 他曾在監獄服刑七個月定罪傳遞一個空頭支票新墨西哥州1977年之後,但到1985年,他是根據合同的CBS晚間新聞。 Lohbeck,誰現在住在阿爾伯克基 - (他收到從兩年前新墨西哥州州長完全赦免),承認在接受電話採訪時說,他準備作證,如果必要的話,他參與波拉德的不成功的努力在1985年經紀人軍售在阿富汗戰爭中的反政府武裝。 在一次會議上與外國外交官,Lohbeck說,波拉德提出作為一個高層次的中央情報局特工。 Lohbeck,誰當時在阿富汗戰爭CBS的主戰場的記者告訴我,波拉德為他提供了,因此CBS,有大量的關於戰爭的機密文件,美國。 他還告訴我說,波拉德從來沒有討論以色列與他或表示對國家的任何特殊的感情。 “我從來沒有聽說過任何政治從周杰倫,”Lohbeck補充說,“除此之外,他試圖把自己作為一個裡根。不是一個關於以色列。周杰倫的唯一的興趣的話在做了很多錢。”
Lohbeck接著說,他也已經準備作證,如果問,關於波拉德的藥物使用。 “周杰倫用大量的可卡因,並且有毫無顧忌地做這件事在公眾面前。他剛剛攤放在桌子上線。” 1985年,Lohbeck作出了類似的聲明,政府官員說,聯邦調查局
波拉德告訴由Lohbeck的說法我,送從北卡羅萊納州一座監獄的回應:“我與Lohbeck關係是非常複雜的,我從來沒有被起訴的任何東西我與他記住。”
其分析報告和預測 - 波拉德移交給以色列的文件並沒有對美國情報的專門產品集中。 他們還透露,美國如何能夠了解它的所作所為 - “來源和方法”定義為智慧的最敏感區域 波拉德給以色列人的海量數據處理特定的美國情報系統以及它們是如何工作的。 例如,他背叛了的,美國的衛星已經起飛軸的照片從高空間的異國功能的詳細信息。 而繞地球在一個方向上,該衛星可拍攝那名看似遠超出範圍區域。 以色列核導彈位點等,其通常會被從美國衛星屏蔽,將因此而被暴露在外面,並且可能被拍照。 “我們監測的以色列人,”一位情報專家告訴我,“而且毫無疑問的以色列人要阻止我們能夠surveil自己的國家。” 沿著波拉德傳遞的數據包含在各種平台的詳細信息 - 在空中,陸地和海上 - 由美國國家安全局的軍事部分攔截以色列的軍事,商業和外交通訊。
在波拉德的間諜的時候,美國水手和士兵受訓的希伯來語選擇組駐紮在附近的哈羅蓋特,英國國家安全局的監聽站,並在美國大使館在特拉維夫,裡面專門建造的設施,他們截獲並翻譯以色列的信號。 其他攔截來自一個無人NSA監聽塞浦路斯崗位。 波拉德的移交數據產生了明顯的影響,專家告訴我,因為“我們可以看到整個過程” - 情報收集的 - “減速” 這也阻礙了美國招收外國代理商的能力。 另一位高級官員評論說,與辛酸,“滲透水平將說服任何有自尊的人源尋找其他種類的工作。”
一些官員的強烈懷疑,以色列人重新包裝大部分波拉德的物質來換取猶太人移民到以色列繼續允許蘇聯提供給蘇聯。 其他官員走得更遠,並說人們有理由相信,秘密信息交換成猶太人在蘇聯高度敏感位置工作。 波拉德的文檔中描述的美國海軍用於追踪世界各地的蘇聯潛艇的技術的顯著比例,其中包括一些,是重要的實際意義只是蘇聯。 一位資深中情局官員誰曾在中東站負責人說,他的理解,“在以色列軍隊的某些內容已經用它” - 波拉德的材料 - “交易的人,他們想出去”,包括猶太科學家在導彈技術和核問題的工作。 波拉德的間諜在來的時候,以色列政府已公開承諾猶太流亡者從蘇聯自由流動的時候。 從以色列或蘇聯檔案文件的形式沒有“確鑿的證據” - - 該官員強調一個事實,即他們沒有確鑿的證據證明波拉德,以色列和蘇聯之間的聯繫,但他們也說,波拉德曾執導他的以色列處理的文件背叛導致了他們沒有其他的結論。
關於以色列 - 蘇聯勾結高層懷疑被表示早在12月,1985年,一個月波拉德被捕後,當威廉·凱西,已故的美國中央情報局局長,誰知道他密切聯繫的以色列領導人,愣之一他站酋長,突然抱怨以色列人打破“基本規則”。 問題出現了,當凱西敦促以色列人加強監測否則例行訪問期間,我被告知由站站長,誰現在退休。 “他問我是否知道這個情況波拉德什麼”的站站長回憶說,他說,凱西補充說,“為了您的信息,以色列人用波拉德獲得我們的攻擊計劃對蘇聯所有它的坐標,射擊位置,序列。而對於猜猜我是誰?蘇維埃“。 (黑體礦 - 浪人)凱西則解釋說,以色列人的交易數據波拉德蘇聯流亡者。 “這怎麼作弊?” 他問。
在隨後的採訪中,凱西的前CIA的同事無法顯著推進他明確斷言。 杜安Clarridge,當時負責在歐洲的秘密行動中,回顧說,中央情報局局長曾告訴他,波拉德材料“並不僅止於在收到這個東西以色列。” 但凱西,誰有許多密切聯繫的以色列情報界,沒有告訴Clarridge他怎麼知道他所知道的。 羅伯特蓋茨,誰成為美國中央情報局副局長在四月,1986年,對我說,凱西從來沒有指示給他,他對波拉德材料抵達莫斯科的具體信息。 “,俄國可能得到一些東西的概念一直是一個觀點,”蓋茨說,但不是通過流亡的權錢交易。 “我聽到的唯一觀點認為,它是通過智能操作” - 克格勃
在任何情況下,有足夠的證據,官員告訴我,包括對智力的可能流向蘇聯國防部長溫伯格絕密的聲明是波拉德的宣判前向法庭陳述。 ,毫無疑問,我是從誰是直接參與的官方獲悉,蘇聯情報能夠獲得在以色列最機密的信息。 “現在的問題,”這位官員說,“是我們是否可以證明它是波拉德的材料去了渡槽,我們無法到達那裡,所以我們提出”在溫伯格宣誓書的可能性存在。 謹慎是必要的,這位官員補充說,對於“擔心對方會說,'這些人看到床底下的間諜。” “
美國司法部還獲悉魯濱遜法官,在一個公開提出備忘錄,即“無數”分析蘇聯導彈系統已售出波拉德以色列,而且這些文件包括“人為來源的身份可以由有能力的推斷信息情報分析員。此外,這些分類出版物“的作者的身份明確標示。
一名退休的海軍上將誰是直接參與調查波拉德告訴我,“毫無疑問,俄國得到了很多的東西,波拉德,唯一的問題是它是如何到達那裡?” 海軍上將,像羅伯特·蓋茨,有另一種解釋。 他指出,以色列將永遠扮演美國國家安全事務的特殊作用。 “我們給他們的東西卡車的我們的官方關係的正常過程中,”海軍上將說。 “他們用它非常有效,他們做的事情值得做,他們會去的地方,我們也不會去的地方,做什麼,我們也不敢做。”
不過,他說,據了解,蘇聯情報部門早就滲入以色列。 (一個重要的蘇聯間諜,Shabtai Kalmanovitch,他們的工作在一個點是緩和俄羅斯移民在以色列的移民,於1987年被逮捕),它是合理的假設波拉德的後果,海軍上將補充說,以色列境內的蘇聯間諜已經習慣了漏斗一些波拉德材料莫斯科。
以以色列人提供波拉德材料的完整會計已經不可能獲得:波拉德本人估計,這些文件將創建一個堆6英尺寬,六英尺長,10英尺高。 拉菲·埃坦,誰控制了操作,和兩位同事他對附著在以色列的外交代表團對以色列 - 厄爾布IRIT和約瑟夫Yagur - 分別命名為未被起訴的同謀由司法部。 在1984年夏天,埃坦帶來上校Aviem蝶鞍,空軍英雄,誰領導以色列的戲劇性和1981年成功轟炸在上的奧西拉克伊拉克的核反應堆。 (蝶鞍最終被起訴,缺席,從事間諜活動的三項罪名。)埃坦決定下令塞拉進入的情況下被許多美國人認為是一個精彩的一筆:以色列的戰爭英雄由波拉德,慢性會見了繁星點點的眼睛崇拜者。
Yagur,僱員再培訓局及蝶鞍在華盛頓時,波拉德被聯邦調查局首次查獲,11月,1985年,但他們很快就離開了這個國家,再也沒有回來。 在一個週期內,波拉德已經移交文件,他們幾乎每週,他們被迫去租房西北部華盛頓,他們安裝了高速影印機。 “安全房屋和特殊靜電複印機?” 美國職業情報官員說,絕望,關於波拉德操作。 “這不是他們想要招募的第一個男人。” 在下面的波拉德被捕並招供的幾年裡,以色列政府選擇不完全與聯邦調查局和司法部合作調查,並波拉德文件只是象徵性地數量已返回。 直到去年五月,以色列政府甚至承認,波拉德曾其執行。
事實上,人們普遍認為,波拉德是不是為以色列從事間諜唯一一個在美國政府。 在他一年間諜的一半,他的以色列處理要求的具體文件,這些文件只被絕密控制數字標識。 很多內部評估後,政府的情報專家得出的結論是,這是“極不可能”,在司法部官員的話說,任何時代的其他美國間諜將不得不進入具體的控制數字。 “世界上只有一個結論,”專家告訴我。 以色列“得到的數字,從別人的美國政府。”
美國國家安全局的男女住在混亂bleeps,熱鬧非凡,和口哨聲的世界,並互相交談約頻率,頻譜,調製和帶寬 - 湯姆克蘭西的小說的東西。 他們經常處理的信號情報,或SIGINT,和他們的世界保持,以便通過一個內部手冊被稱為拉津的縮寫無線電信號符號。 該手冊,這是機密“絕密本影,”填補十卷,是不斷更新,並列出所有已知信號的物理參數。 波拉德了這一切。 “這是聖經,”一原通信,情報官員告訴我。 “它告訴我們如何收集信號在世界任何地方。” 現場,頻率和顯著以色列通信功能 - 那些被稱為和有針對性的NSA - 分別在拉津; 所以都採用蘇聯的知名通信鏈路。
在拉津的損失尤為尷尬的海軍,有人告訴我,由退役海軍上將,因為波拉德影印副本屬於海軍情報辦公室。 “他走進我們的圖書館,發現我們已經出了最新版本的,要求一個新的,並通過它,”軍官說。 “我很驚訝,我們甚至有吧。”
該拉津盜竊罪被引用國防部長溫伯格的秘密仍然宣布法院波拉德的量刑聽證會前的細節之一。 事實上,聽證會的最戲劇性的時刻來到時,波拉德的律師理查德·A Hibey,樂於承認,他的當事人有罪,但辯稱,對美國國家安全的損害程度沒有要求判處最高刑期。
“我想請你想想國防部的誓章的秘書,因為它涉及到的只有一件事,”魯濱遜法官插話道,“參考出版物的一個特殊類別,我看不出你如何能促成這樣的說法。” 他邀請Hibey接近板凳,連同司法部的律師,組花了一些時間審查什麼政府官員告訴我是溫伯格帳戶的葡萄乾的重要性。 一位司法部官員,回顧那些時刻有明顯的快感,他說,拉津是溫伯格損害評估名單上的第九個項目。 板凳會議結束後,Hibey沒有做進一步的嘗試,以盡量減少造成其盜竊國家安全的損害。 (援引國家安全,Hibey拒絕討論這篇文章的情況。)
該十卷拉津的可用在有需要時方知的基礎國安局內部“我從來沒有見過的怪物,”一位前高級官員的手錶在國家安全局截獲現場在歐洲對我說,但補充說,他並監督人誰經常用它,並且他在易於理解的術語描述其功能:
“這是什麼,美國是聽一個完整的目錄,或者可以聽 - '參數數據”在國家安全局稱信息 它會告訴你你想了解一個特定的信號一切 - 這是首次發現何地,它最早是由,它有什麼樣的實體,頻率,波長,或帶長當你複製一個人的時候。信號,不知道它是什麼,在拉津手冊提供了一個描述“。 一位高級情報官員誰經常諮詢與NSA就技術問題後來告訴我說,另一個問題涉及到幾何。
一位高級情報官員誰經常諮詢與NSA就技術問題後來告訴我說,另一個問題涉及到幾何。 該拉津,他解釋說,已經集中特別是對蘇聯及其數千高頻,短波或通信,這已使俄羅斯軍事單位在巨大的土地質量的兩端互相溝通。 這些信號“反彈”落電離層和經常截獲最佳數千英里,從他們的原點。 如果,因為許多在美國情報界懷疑,蘇聯通訊專家已經能夠學習,他們的信號正在監測,何地,他們可以重新定位信號,並迫使NSA投入工時和金錢來試圖奪回它。 或者,更可能的是,蘇聯可以繼續以正常的方式進行溝通,但傳遞虛假和誤導性的信息。
在拉津的波拉德的背叛把國家安全局在有質疑或重新評估其所有的情報蒐集的立場。 “我們不是完美的,”職業情報官向我解釋。 “我們已經得到了孔在我們的覆蓋範圍,而這個” - 的拉津的損失 - 告訴那裡的偏見和弱點。 這是我們如何把工作做好,以及我們將如何完成這項工作。“
“多麼美妙的深入了解,我們認為,和究竟如何,我們正在利用蘇聯的通信!” 退役海軍上將感嘆道。“這是一個如何對做它的書 - 密碼學的爐邊菜譜不僅分析,但我們如何得出我們的分析事實無論配方你想要的。”
波拉德,問他妥協的具體方案,對我說,“至於SIGINT信息來講,政府一直在撒謊什麼我給以色列人的公版。”
中期二十世紀八十年代,從羅塔,西班牙海軍第六艦隊海洋監視信息設施(FOSIF)的每日報告,是美國的冷戰主食之一。絕密文件每天早上0800祖魯時間(格林威治時間)申請,該公司報告所有在過去24小時說去了就在中東,所記錄的NSA最先進的監測設備。
該報告是著名的海軍裡面為他們的複雜性和可靠性的命令; 它們是基於,作為高層管理者的理解是,雙方通過在整個中東情報人員,並通過截獲蘇聯軍事通信的最先進的技術手段提供的數據。在羅塔海軍的情報共享設施的空間巨大NSA攔截站,超過七百語言學家和密碼學家所佔據,這是負責監測和所有北非的軍事和外交通信進行解碼。許多在羅塔花了數百個小時,一個月聽而鎖定在絕密的車廂搭乘美國軍艦,飛機和潛艇在地中海經營。
海軍的主要目標是船舶,飛機,以及最重要的是,蘇聯在巡邏在地中海的核潛艇。這些潛艇,其核導彈瞄準美國的力量,不斷被跟踪; 他們將有針對性和小時內被摧毀,如果戰爭爆發了。
波拉德的美國審訊最終得出的結論是在他當年和間諜的一半,他所提供的以色列人有超過一年的,從羅塔日常FOSIF報告。波拉德親口告訴美國人,在1985年中的一個點以色列人嘮叨他時,他錯過了,因為疾病的工作,幾天未能交付FOSIF這些天的報導。他的一個處理程序,約瑟夫Yagur,曾抱怨再三錯過的消息,並要求他找到一個方法來檢索它們。波拉德告訴他的美國審訊,他從來沒有再度偏出。
職業情報官員誰幫助評估波拉德損害已經到了波拉德查看作為串行間諜,情報世界的特德·邦迪。“波拉德給他們的每封郵件了整整一年,”軍官最近告訴我,指的是以色列人。“他們可以分析它” - 智能 - 。“消息由消息和關聯它,他們不僅能夠拼湊我們的來源和方法,也了解我們如何思考,如何對待的一個問題突然,有沒有什麼神秘的。這些事情是我們無法改變的。你有這個,你的球了我們“。換句話說,在羅塔報導,當仔細研究,給了以色列人的各種美國收集方法和屏蔽正在進行的軍事行動“如何規避路線圖”。該報告提供指導“如何讓我們睡著了,想著一切運作良好,”他補充說。“他們告訴以色列人如何突襲突尼斯沒有通風報信美國情報提前,這是傷害是持久而嚴重。”
不上交波拉德每個文檔處理,信號情報。撥號硬幣的縮寫,國防情報局的社區在線智能系統,這是政府的第一台電腦的信息檢索,網絡系統之一。該系統,這是比較原始的中期二十世紀八十年代 - 它使用了8088芯片的運行和thermafax紙 - 不能由具體問題或關鍵字來訪問,但噴出了大量的網絡情報數據的按時間框架。然而,撥號硬幣包含了所有提交的空軍,陸軍,海軍的情報報告,並重視海洋在以色列和中東其他地區。誰 介入了與它一負責人最近告訴我,“這是充滿了偉大的東西,尤其是在人力情報 - 人類的智力許多美國人誰去中東的業務或政治原因同意,作為忠誠的公民,被盤問。他們的訪問後,美國國防武官他們答應匿名 - 有很多親密的朋友在以色列境內和誰也通過他們的合作心疼附近的阿拉伯國家 - 和報告被列為“這是誰在說話給誰,”軍官。說,“就像交給你了間諜的地址簿了一年。”
政府調查發現,該系統的最重要的用戶在1984年之一,1985年喬納森·波拉德。他擁有所有必要的許可和必要的憑證來獲得訪問五角大樓分類庫; 他也明白,圖書館,即使是在秘密圖書館,總是熱心幫助,並在一個事例,他仗著庫保安。與有些懊惱,參與調查波拉德回憶官員波拉德曾經收集了,他需要一個手推車來移動文件到他的車,在附近的停車場這麼多的數據,以及保安員持有的大門為他。
波拉德還提供了以色列人什麼,也許是最重要的一天到一天的信息,信號情報:全國SIGINT需求列表,這是本質上的任務彙編,以及這些任務的優先級,給予不同的國家安全局收集單位世界各地。轟炸任務之前,例如,美國衛星可能會被重新部署,在巨大的財務成本,為客戶提供目標區域的瞬時電子覆蓋。此外,NSA場站將被責令開始各軍事單位,特別是密集的監測目標國家。特別NSA覆蓋率也將被美國秘密軍事單位訂購前,如陸軍的三角洲部隊或海軍海豹隊,插入敵方領土或敵對水域。有時,國家安全局的要求是不全面:歐洲或中東的業務涉嫌銷售化學武器的潛在對手可能會放在國家安全局“觀察名單”和它的傳真,電傳上,和其他通信仔細監測。需求清單是“像一個巨大的待辦事項,”一位前國家安全局工作告訴我的。“如果一個客戶” - 有人在情報界 - “要求的具體報導,這將是每天更新名單。” 也就是說,覆蓋的目標將是已知的。
“如果我們要轟炸伊拉克,我們將轉向系統,”一位資深專家隨後對我說。“這是一個在那裡跳著出場的美國重點將是”。隨著名單,專家補充說,以色列“能看到我們把我們收集系統”前的軍事行動,並最終明白過來有多美武裝力量“改變我們的重點。” 換句話說,他補充說,以色列“可能讓我們的智能系統的主要目標”,並隱藏任何被認為是必要的。“損害的推移過去周杰倫的被捕,”專家說,“可以擴展到今天。”
以色列取得了戲劇性的利用波拉德材料在1985年10月1日,他被逮捕,當其空軍轟炸巴勒斯坦解放組織在突尼斯的總部,造成至少67人從七週。在美國,這是由操作驚訝,最終得出的結論是,以色列策劃了協同結合SIGINT需求清單的一天到一天與見解的FOSIF報告和其他數據的戰略情報,波拉德提供完全騙過我們在中東地區政府的巨額收集設備。即使波拉德自己的高級官員告訴我,“不知道什麼他就給了。” 克林頓總統的要求波拉德案件的審查由情報界官員及其他有關各方的結果是由1月11日提交給白宮。一位前司法部官員告訴我,“沒有人可以相信,任何總統將有膽釋放這種間諜。” 但作為報告編寫的白宮指的是司法部說服一些情報官員,克林頓正在考慮一個妥協,比如上下班波拉德的無期徒刑至二十五年徒刑的問題的性質。
關於減刑查詢從羅傑亞當斯,總統的赦免律師,而是從查爾斯拉夫俱樂部,白宮法律顧問來了沒有。“波拉德將獲得一半的麵包,”一位悲痛欲絕的職業情報官員告訴我。該協議被認為是正在考慮將良好的行為為他的釋放,具有定時關機,在2002年夏天該解決方案具有一定的“政治之美,”這位官員補充說 - 在白宮的眼睛。“波拉德不出去馬上,這個問題不會引起任何麻煩。並得到美國彎腰將是以色列的一個嚴重的勝利。”
一位高級情報官員的機構參與編寫報告白宮告訴我,有點滑稽,他將放棄所有反對波拉德的立即釋放,如果以色列政府將回答兩個問題:“第一,給我們的名單是什麼你有,第二,告訴我們你做什麼。“ 這樣的答案是不太可能即將到來。以色列政府已經承認,是波拉德間諜確實代表其但拒絕 - 儘管不斷懇求 - 提供美國與被移交給它的文件的完整列表。
情報界的一些成員現在認為自己是進行反對總統誰,他們認為這是急於分裂波拉德的命運與以色列的差異戲劇性的保持作用。他們認為比爾·克林頓作為調解人誰也不會猶豫交易波拉德的以色列人,如果他認為這將推動以色列成為一個和平解決,並導致外交政策的成功。該官員強調,他們支持克林頓的努力解決中東危機,但不認為這是適當的使用波拉德作為談判籌碼。
增加了他們的沮喪,一些官員明確,就是克林頓本人,在研究了案件年前,當他正在考慮伊扎克·拉賓的請求寬大處理的事實,知道其他人一樣,在美國政府對波拉德的背叛的意義。一位知情官員形容私人時光在懷和平峰會時特尼特,中央情報局局長,警告總統波拉德獲釋會激怒瓦解情報界。“他得到了回來,”有關負責人告訴我,“是'不,不要擔心它,它就會平息。” “
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Jonathan Johns
".@BI_Defense #Snowden's Laptops May Hold 'Extremely Sensitive' Details About #NSA - #CIA Black Bag Jobs http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-may-have-details-on-black-bag-jobs-2013-7 … #HackingTeam
Snowden's Laptops May Hold 'Extremely Sensitive' Details About NSA-CIA 'Black Bag Jobs'
Jul 18 2013.FBI Director Robert Mueller (L), Director of National Intelligence James Clapper (C) and CIA Director John Brennan testify before a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on ‘Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States’ on Capitol Hill in Washington March 12, 2013.
Matthew Aid of Foreign Policy has published an excellent report detailing the secret intelligence gathering partnership between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Essentially, when the NSA cannot gain access to certain computers or gadgets, the spy agency calls on specially-trained CIA clandestine operators to bug, tap, or steal the information, often from foreign governments and military or multinational corporations.
Aid reports that these break-ins — referred to as “black bag jobs,” “surreptitious entries,” or “off-net operations” — are occurring “at a tempo not seen since the height of the Cold War.”
He notes that the specific nature and extent of the partnership is deemed to be extremely sensitive, “especially since many of these operations are directed against friends and allies” of the U.S.
Enter Edward Snowden.
According to Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald, the thousands of documents that the NSA whistleblower/leaker stole would “allow somebody who read them to know exactly how the NSA does what it does, which would in turn allow them to evade that surveillance or replicate it.”
Aid writes that one of the major fears of U.S. intelligence officials is that “details of these operations, including the identities of the targets covered by these operations, currently reside in the four laptops reportedly held by Edward Snowden. … Officials at both the CIA and NSA know that the public disclosure of these operations would cause incalculable damage to U.S. intelligence operations abroad.”
On May 20 Snowden arrived in Hong Kong from Hawaii with “four laptop computers that enable him to gain access to some of the US government’s most highly-classified secrets,” but it is unclear where Snowden’s laptops currently are.
On the one hand, the former CIA technician’s Hong Kong lawyer told The New York Times that the 30-year-old after left China after he learned he could spend years in prison without access to a computer during the extradition process — suggesting that he may have kept his computers with him.
On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal reported that he did not have any luggage to check when he boarded a flight to Moscow on June 23.
Furthermore, it is unclear if the data has been or could be compromised.
In a letter to former U.S. Senator Gordon Humphreys published on Tuesday, Snowden stated:
“I have not provided any information that would harm our people – agent or not – and I have no intention to do so.
Further, no intelligence service — not even our own — has the capacity to compromise the secrets I continue to protect. … You may rest easy knowing I cannot be coerced into revealing that information, even under torture.”
Former senior U.S. intelligence analyst Joshua Foust disputes that first claim, noting that the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported it “decided not to publish details it has seen about secret operations that could endanger the lives of NSA workers.”
Others doubt that Snowden “cannot be coerced, even under torture.”
Nevertheless, as Aid notes, “If anyone wonders why the U.S. government wants to get its hands on Edward Snowden and his computers so badly,” the fact that he may have access to the super secret NSA partnership “is an important reason why.”
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斯諾登的筆記本電腦可能會保持“極度敏感”關於詳細NSA-中情局“黑包喬布斯
美國聯邦調查局局長羅伯特·米勒(L),國家情報詹姆斯·克拉珀主任(C)和中央情報局局長約翰·布倫南在參議院情報委員會的聽證會上作證“當前和預計國家安全的威脅到美國在華盛頓國會山3月12日, 2013。
外交政策的馬修援助發表一份出色的報告 ,詳細說明了美國國家安全局(NSA)和中央情報局(CIA)的秘密情報蒐集合作夥伴關係。
從本質上講,當NSA不能訪問某些計算機或小工具,間諜機構專門訓練的中情局秘密經營者呼籲,以蟲,自來水,或竊取信息,往往是從外國政府和軍事或跨國公司。
援助報告說,這些闖入 - 被稱為“黑包就業”,“偷偷摸摸項”或“脫網操作” - 正在發生“的節奏,因為冷戰的高度,沒見過”。
他指出,該夥伴關係的具體性質和程度被認為是極其敏感的,“尤其是因為許多這些操作都是針對朋友和盟國”美國
進入愛德華斯諾登。
據衛報記者格倫·格林沃爾德,在成千上萬的文件NSA舉報人/洩密者將偷“讓別人誰讀他們知道國家安全局究竟是如何做的事情做,這將反過來讓他們逃避的監視或複製它。 “
援助寫道,一個主要擔憂的美國情報官員的是,“這些操作,其中包括涵蓋這些操作目標的身份的細節,目前居住在四筆記本電腦由愛德華·斯諾登據稱舉行。 ......官員同時在中央情報局和國家安全局知道,公開披露這些操作會導致國外對美國情報行動無法估量的損失。“
5月20日抵達斯諾登在香港夏威夷“四筆記本電腦,使他獲得了一些美國政府最高度機密分類的,”但目前還不清楚目前的地方是斯諾登的筆記本電腦。
在一方面,前中情局技術人員的香港律師告訴紐約時報說,30歲之後,離開中國後,他得知他可能在引渡過程中花費數年監禁,不得使用電腦-這表明他可能一直保持他的電腦他。
在另一方面,華爾街日報報導稱, 他沒有任何行李檢查時,他登上了飛往莫斯科6月23日。
此外, 目前還不清楚 ,如果數據已被或可能被破壞。
在寫給美國前參議員戈登·漢弗萊週二公佈 ,斯諾登說:
“我還沒有提供任何信息,這將傷害我們的人 - 代理商或不 - 我不打算這樣做。
此外,沒有智慧的服務 - 甚至不是我們自己 - 有妥協的秘密我繼續保護能力。 ...您可以高枕無憂知道我不能強迫透露的信息,即使是在折磨。“
前美國高級情報分析員約書亞福斯特對此有異議第一次索賠 ,並指出,德國報紙明鏡周刊報導了“決定不公佈細節也有過關於暗箱操作的可能危及美國國家安全局工作人員的生命 。“
其他懷疑是斯諾登“不能強迫,甚至在折磨。”
不過,由於援助筆記,“如果有人想知道,為什麼美國政府希望得到它的手愛德華·斯諾登和他的電腦得很厲害,”事實上,他可能有機會獲得超級秘密NSA的合作夥伴關係“是一個重要原因。”
==========
"Brazen Snowden was on Twitter and saw that it's tail Russia rat legs and knees Kneel;
Too importune Ecstasy is ISIS poison!
In the extreme fantasy addiction became executioner IS @! Fuck !!
Dirty thoughts and behavior same as the China pig, communist Russia as a mouse,
Has been sell out our home, our country, our world is a good time to extremist monitor terrorists!
This is no different of personally killed others!
Such extreme hatred hypocritical traitor betray intelligence!
If there is has Death penalty, then! My God, give them to the hell ever!
Amen ~
#Opchina #OpTatwan #ophk
#OpISIS #Op_Tibet #OpRussian
Melody.Blog sincere pledge ``
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"厚顏無恥的斯諾登還是在推特上,看到這尾俄羅斯老鼠雙腿下跪;
被ISIS毒藥迷魂得胡攪蠻纏!
中上毒癮極度幻想成了IS劊子手@!他媽的!!
骯臟的思想和行為與支那豬共產主義一樣的俄羅斯老鼠,
一直在出賣我們的家,我們的國,我們的世界中監控極端恐怖份子的好時機!
這與親手殺害別人沒有分別!
極度憎恨這種出賣情報的虛偽的叛徒!
假如還有死刑的話!請我主 賜牠到地獄吧!
阿門~
#Opchina #OpTatwan #ophk
#OpISIS #Op_Tibet #OpRussian
Melody.Blog誠懇祈願``
=====
*-By-businessinsider.com reported - "reportedly, ISIS use disclosure of information by Edward Snowden to figure out how to avoid the intelligence authorities !!" and - by the nytimes.com reported "ISIS responsible to take measures in order to ensure the survival of the group ???! "- the most fortunate news is that the" Turkey agreed to assist us in the fight against air raids ISIS !! "-
-由 -businessinsider.com報導的--"據報導,ISIS使用由愛德華·斯諾登洩露的信息弄清楚如何規避情報當局!!"和-由nytimes.com報導的"ISIS負責人採取措施,以確保集團的生存???!"-最慶幸的消息是這則"土耳其同意協助我們打擊空襲ISIS!!"-
**All The Would Lauguage**-
http://melody-free-shaing.blogspot.com/2015/08/by-businessinsidercom-reported.html
===Melody.Blog Sincere...===
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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